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## Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (2020)

### DETAILS

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# Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine

Committee on Equitable Allocation of Vaccine  
for the Novel Coronavirus

**DISCLAIMER:** This discussion draft is not intended to be the final framework recommended by the committee, and the information contained herein is subject to change based on public comments and further committee deliberations. The committee's final report and recommended framework is forthcoming.

The public comment period will be available from 12:00 p.m. ET on Tuesday, September 1, 2020, until 11:59 p.m. ET on Friday, September 4, 2020. For additional information on how to submit comments, please visit <https://www.nationalacademies.org/VaccineAllocationComment>

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**DISCUSSION DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT**

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## **BACKGROUND**

As part of the overall study, the Committee on Equitable Allocation of Vaccine for the Novel Coronavirus is releasing a discussion draft of its framework for public comment. This discussion draft outlines a preliminary framework for equitable allocation of COVID-19 vaccine. Please note that this is a discussion draft of only the framework. Other aspects of the Statement of Task, including risk communication, steps to mitigate vaccine hesitancy, and global considerations will be addressed in the final report.

## **STATEMENT OF TASK**

An ad hoc committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine will develop an overarching framework for vaccine allocation to assist policy makers in the domestic and global health communities in planning for equitable allocation of vaccines against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The expectation is that such a framework would inform the decisions by health authorities, including the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), as they create and implement national and/or local guidelines for SARS-CoV-2 vaccine allocation. As part of this effort, the committee will consider the following:

- What criteria should be used in setting priorities for equitable allocation of vaccine?
- How should the criteria be applied in determining the first tier of vaccine recipients? As more vaccine becomes available, what populations should be added successively to the priority list of recipients? How do we take into account factors such as:
  - Health disparities and other health access issues
  - Individuals at higher risk (e.g., elderly, underlying health conditions)
  - Occupations at higher risk (e.g., health care workers, essential industries, meat packing plants, military)
  - Populations at higher risk (e.g., racial and ethnic groups, incarcerated individuals, residents of nursing homes, individuals who are homeless)
  - Geographic distribution of active virus spread
  - Countries/populations involved in clinical trials
- How will the framework apply in various scenarios (e.g., different characteristics of vaccines and differing available doses)?
- If multiple vaccine candidates are available, how should we ensure equity?
- How can countries ensure equity in allocation of COVID-19 vaccines?
- For the United States, how can communities of color be assured access to vaccination?
- How can we communicate to the American public about vaccine allocation to minimize perceptions of lack of equity?
- What steps should be taken to mitigate vaccine hesitancy, especially among high-priority populations?

## **COMMITTEE SPONSORS**

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health and

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## A Note from the Committee Co-Chairs

The Committee on Equitable Allocation of Vaccine for the Novel Coronavirus has produced a *Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine* for comment. The committee believes it is critical to hear from the public on the draft framework and welcomes the public's input.

It is important to note that this is a preliminary draft and only one part of the full and final report. This draft addresses the committee's initial thoughts on how to allocate COVID-19 vaccine in the United States. This discussion draft includes:

- An exploration of lessons learned from past allocation frameworks;
- A discussion of the foundational principles that inform the committee's framework;
- A presentation of and rationale for the overarching goal of the framework;
- A discussion of the criteria for determining an equitable allocation framework;
- An outline of the vaccine allocation phases and the rationale for prioritizing each group included in each phase as informed by the goal and criteria; and
- An examination of the vaccine allocation framework's application under various scenarios.

Critically, per the committee's Statement of Task, the final report will include a final vaccine allocation framework informed by public comments and will also include additional content that grounds it in the realities of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Introductory sections will describe the health, social, and economic impacts of COVID-19 in the United States, including data-driven observations of health inequity and the disproportionate effects of COVID-19 on particular communities. The committee is monitoring evolving data and evidence to ensure an accurate understanding and description of the impact of COVID-19 across the United States.

Concluding sections will focus primarily on implementation of the framework. Topics to be covered include the committee's considerations and recommendations on issues related to vaccination program administration, evaluation, and assessment (to ensure effectiveness and equity); vaccine hesitancy, demand, and promotion; and risk communication and strategies for community engagement. Last, the committee will briefly address global considerations and the United States' role in vaccine allocation in the global arena. While some of these topics may be mentioned at a cursory level in the *Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine*, the committee acknowledges the importance of these orbiting topics and will expand on them in the final report.

Members of the public are invited to provide feedback on the preliminary framework during a 4-day public comment period that begins at 12:00 p.m. ET on Tuesday, September 1, 2020, and concludes at 11:59 p.m. ET on Friday, September 4, 2020. In addition to the written

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public comment period, the committee will host an online public listening session from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. ET on Wednesday, September 2, 2020, to solicit feedback from interested members of the public.

Thank you for taking the time to read the committee's *Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine*. We look forward to receiving and reviewing public feedback to inform the committee's work.

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24 principles and prioritization criteria established by concurrent efforts being led by the World  
25 Health Organization (WHO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's)  
26 Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and others to develop frameworks for  
27 allocating COVID-19 vaccines.

## 28 **LESSONS FROM MASS VACCINATION CAMPAIGNS FOR PRIOR INFECTIOUS** 29 **DISEASE OUTBREAKS**

30 A mass vaccination campaign for an infectious disease outbreak is a complex enterprise  
31 that requires balancing different strategies for allocation, distribution, administration, access, and  
32 other considerations. Each infectious disease outbreak differs in terms of its clinical  
33 characteristics and impact across various populations, thus each outbreak requires a tailored mass  
34 vaccination approach. Although the committee was tasked with developing a framework  
35 specifically for allocation, looking back at some of the broader successes and challenges of  
36 previous mass vaccination campaigns is instructive from both operational and ethical  
37 perspectives. For instance, prior campaigns can illustrate how distribution systems can make  
38 different allocation schemes more or less feasible and how the choice of distribution system can  
39 support or impede choices regarding allocation. The committee identified several key lessons  
40 learned from prior mass vaccination campaigns that relate to or impact on vaccine allocation,  
41 which are outlined in Box 1 later in this section.

### 42 **H1N1 Influenza Vaccination Campaign (2009)**

43 The development of the U.S. plan for vaccine allocation and distribution in response to  
44 the 2009 H1N1 influenza A pandemic illustrated some of the fundamental challenges involved in  
45 implementing a mass national vaccination campaign at the local level, where many jurisdictions  
46 have limited resources and capacity (Rambhia et al., 2010). CDC's ACIP began planning an  
47 ambitious vaccination program shortly after the first cases were detected in the United States in  
48 June 2009 and vaccine development was under way (IOM, 2010). Based on epidemiological data  
49 from the first wave in the United States, ACIP recommended that vaccination efforts should  
50 target five groups: (1) pregnant women, (2) people who lived with or cared for infants <6 months  
51 old, (3) health care and emergency medical service personnel, (4) people aged >6 months to 24

52 years, and (5) adults aged 25–64 years with chronic health disorders or compromised immune  
53 systems. At that time, the number of vaccine doses that would be required was unknown. To  
54 facilitate centralized distribution of the forthcoming H1N1 vaccine, the national vaccine  
55 distribution plan leveraged the existing federal Vaccines for Children program, through which  
56 state and local health departments supplied providers with recommended pediatric vaccines.  
57 Vaccines funded by the federal government were allocated to states based on their population  
58 size, regardless of disease burden or number of people who fell into ACIP’s priority categories.  
59 In September 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved four monovalent  
60 H1N1 influenza vaccines, including one intranasal and three injectable forms.<sup>1</sup> CDC created a  
61 centralized distribution system for shipping vaccines to states for the national vaccine campaign  
62 that began the next month (IOM, 2010). State and local health departments were left to develop  
63 and implement their own distribution plans, with some states choosing to closely follow ACIP’s  
64 recommendations for priority groups and others choosing to adapt them (Rambhia et al., 2010).

65 The H1N1 vaccine program benefited from prior planning and funding to support vaccine  
66 production, as well as the use of a central distribution mechanism. It also provided state and local  
67 jurisdictions with flexibility and autonomy in developing their own distribution plans. However,  
68 major challenges began to emerge in the early months of the rollout. The vaccine supply  
69 schedule that was projected by manufacturers and accepted by the U.S. government was much  
70 faster than could actually be achieved, which severely limited the supply when demand was high.  
71 The initial supply was insufficient even to cover ACIP’s target populations, which undermined  
72 the government’s credibility when the promised number of vaccine doses could not be delivered  
73 (GAO, 2011). By the time supply was more ample, it was clear that the virus rarely caused  
74 severe illness and demand crashed; thus, there was far too little vaccine until there was far too  
75 much. Furthermore, the ability of state and local authorities to choose their own distribution  
76 methods (e.g., health care providers, local health departments, pharmacies) led to confusion and  
77 communication challenges. Health authorities struggled with dilemmas, such as deciding  
78 whether to turn away patients who were not part of initial priority groups, determining when to  
79 allow broader immunization to occur, and coordinating across jurisdictions about their decisions.  
80 Furthermore, the 100-dose minimum vaccine order required for shipment was a barrier for

---

<sup>1</sup> A fifth injectable monovalent vaccine was later approved by FDA in November 2009. More information about the H1N1 influenza vaccines is available at <https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/influenza-h1n1-2009-monovalent> (accessed August 18, 2020).



81 localities that did not need that many doses (GAO, 2011). Conflicts also emerged regarding  
82 certain priority groups—including children—that were established without a clear system to  
83 track high-priority individuals. Consequently, vaccinators had to develop ad hoc relationships  
84 with local providers and other stakeholders to ensure that they reached individuals designated as  
85 having priority (Rambhia et al., 2010). The distribution of vaccines was not fully tracked from  
86 manufacturers to individuals, undercutting the ability to efficiently administer the vaccine to  
87 those most in need and to monitor supplies (IOM, 2010). Ancillary supplies, such as syringes,  
88 were distributed separately, but in some cases they were inappropriate for their intended use and  
89 some were of varying quality. Although the shortage of vaccine was hugely problematic at the  
90 outset, the demand had decreased by January 2010 and many vaccine doses were left unused. Of  
91 note is that the demand for influenza vaccine generally drops around that time of year, even as  
92 seasonal influenza peaks.

93 The Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) conducted an after-action  
94 assessment of its response to the H1N1 pandemic, which identified successes and challenges  
95 with respect to vaccine distribution (Litaker et al., 2010). A major success was the use of a  
96 public-private partnership, led by the DSHS, to allocate and distribute the vaccine to local  
97 jurisdictions, supported by the rapid implementation of a vaccine management system.  
98 Availability of the vaccine was identified as a major challenge. Due to the timing of when the  
99 vaccine became available, the H1N1 strain could not be included in the seasonal influenza  
100 vaccine, so two separate vaccines had to be produced.

#### 101 *CDC's Roadmap to Implementing Pandemic Influenza Vaccination of Critical Workforce*

102 As part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) 2017 Pandemic  
103 Influenza Plan, CDC built on lessons learned in vaccine allocation during the 2009 H1N1  
104 pandemic to develop a Roadmap to Implementing Pandemic Influenza Vaccination of Critical  
105 Workforce. This framework provides guidance for state and local level efforts to target and  
106 allocate pandemic influenza vaccine in scenarios in which vaccine demand exceeds supply  
107 (CDC, 2019). For an influenza pandemic of high or very high severity, the roadmap identifies  
108 five tiers of population groups, stratified by priority for vaccination:

109

- 110           • Tier 1: the highest priority target groups who serve important societal needs (e.g.,  
 111           health care providers, emergency services personnel, pandemic vaccine and antiviral  
 112           drug manufacturers) and vulnerable populations,<sup>2</sup> such as pregnant women and  
 113           infants;
- 114           • Tier 2: groups critical to national security (e.g., National Guard, intelligence  
 115           services), critical community support personnel (e.g., pharmacists), other critical  
 116           infrastructure (e.g., just-in-time utility services), high-risk children aged 3–18 years  
 117           old, and household contacts of infants <6 months old;
- 118           • Tier 3: other critical infrastructure groups (e.g., those that maintain transportation,  
 119           financial infrastructure), other health care, critical government personnel, and  
 120           children aged 3–18 years without a high-risk condition;
- 121           • Tier 4: adults aged 19–64 years with high-risk conditions and adults aged >65 years;  
 122           and
- 123           • Tier 5: healthy adults aged 19–64 years not included in other groups.

#### 124           **Vaccination Campaign During Ebola Epidemic in West Africa (2013–2016)**

125           WHO developed an operational plan for the allocation and distribution of Ebola vaccines  
 126           in response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa (2013–2016) (Costa, n.d.). The goal was to  
 127           make the best possible use of limited vaccine supplies in accordance with guiding principles of  
 128           equity and transparency. The vaccine would be deployed using clear, pre-established criteria for  
 129           allocation based on appropriate scientific and ethical foundations, with information shared  
 130           equitably and decision making by consensus. The plan proposed that vaccines be deployed first  
 131           to a qualified subset of health care workers, given that this population comprised the highest  
 132           number of cases and had the greatest risk of infection; they could also be feasibly vaccinated and  
 133           would likely be most amenable to data collection efforts (Gostin, 2014). After all health care  
 134           workers in designated countries were vaccinated, a public vaccination strategy would be  
 135           implemented in the most affected districts in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia (Costa, n.d.).  
 136           Phase 2 and 3 trial results were available to inform the strategy, including data on vaccine  
 137           efficacy, impacts of vaccination, feasibility of vaccination, and vaccination policies for various

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<sup>2</sup> These populations also have substantially greater morbidity and mortality associated with influenza than other population groups.

138 age groups, sexes, and pregnant women. Proposed vaccination strategies included both mass  
139 vaccination in each affected nation and a ring vaccination approach.<sup>3</sup> Important data and legal  
140 considerations included ownership, WHO donations, countries' requests for vaccines, legal  
141 liability, informed consent, authorization by national regulatory authorities for vaccine use, and  
142 data collection and sharing.

143 In the early months of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, lack of effective community  
144 engagement was among the barriers that delayed a rapid and effective response; it also  
145 contributed to fear and stigma around the disease and potential vaccine among community  
146 members. The design and delivery of the Ebola vaccine trials in Sierra Leone during and after  
147 the outbreak sought to address this through engagement strategies that included local community  
148 liaison teams. A qualitative study looked at these strategies for engaging communities and  
149 building trust to encourage vaccine trial participation (Dada et al., 2019). The study found that  
150 four principles were critical for building trust with community members: (1) ensuring reciprocal  
151 communication; (2) communicating using relatable examples; (3) fostering interpersonal  
152 relationships; and (4) respecting community members and their culture.

153 The Ebola vaccine campaign also illustrates the stark consequences of allocation  
154 decisions to exclude certain groups from potentially life-saving vaccination. Although the  
155 proposed criteria for deployment according to vaccine availability considered including pregnant  
156 women (Costa, n.d.), WHO ultimately recommended against vaccinating pregnant and  
157 breastfeeding women against Ebola, even if they were registered as contacts of known cases  
158 (Soucheray, 2019).<sup>4</sup> This decision was contentious from both ethical and public health  
159 perspectives (Faden et al., 2018). Limited evidence of the safety of the live vaccine in pregnant  
160 and lactating women was a rationale, but this group was largely excluded from the clinical trials  
161 to establish the vaccine's safety profile and potential fetal risk (Gomes et al., 2017). Evidence  
162 soon emerged that pregnancy is associated with increased risks of infection, high risk of maternal  
163 death (>90 percent), and even greater risk of neonatal death related to Ebola virus disease (Bebell

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<sup>3</sup> A ring vaccination strategy focuses on vaccinating the social networks of people with laboratory-confirmed disease, including household contacts, contacts of contacts (e.g., neighbors, friends, workplace contacts, extended family). A vaccination ring typically includes an average of 150 individuals. Source: <https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/ebola/frequently-asked-questions/ebola-vaccine> (accessed August 24, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> Children were also excluded from the vaccination deployment at the early stages, although they were included in the Ebola vaccine trials conducted in East Africa.

164 et al., 2017; Black et al., 2015). Women of childbearing age are also more likely to be caregivers  
 165 for relatives who are sick (Faden et al., 2018). Despite this mounting evidence suggesting that  
 166 the benefit of vaccination outweighed the risk for pregnant and lactating women, WHO did not  
 167 reverse the decision until February 2019, during a subsequent outbreak in the Democratic  
 168 Republic of the Congo (UN News, 2019).  
 169

### **BOX 1**

#### **Key Lessons Learned from Prior Mass Vaccination Efforts**

- Leverage relationships with professional medical societies and other key downstream stakeholders from the outset.
- When cost, insurance and other policies create barriers, consider the issue of rationing at the state, local, and practice levels.
- Develop effective systems for tracking distribution.
- Ensure that ancillary supply distribution is timely and appropriate.
- “Under-promise and over-deliver” in planning and communication efforts.
- Ensure up-to-date information on vaccine production, inventory, and projections via stronger and more formal partnerships between federal entities and vaccine producers.
- Plan for a range of vaccine supply scenarios.
- Continue to use the Vaccines for Children program infrastructure as a basis for emergency vaccination distribution programs; consider something similar for adults.
- Deploy limited vaccine supplies equitably and transparently using pre-established, evidence-based criteria to prioritize allocation.
- Promote global regulatory harmonization and standardization in vaccine development to improve speed, flexibility, and efficiency.
- Consistent, respectful, accurate communication to earn, secure, and maintain trust.

#### **170 Frameworks for Allocating Pandemic Influenza Vaccines**

171 Many countries have developed national plans and frameworks to prepare for the  
 172 allocation of limited vaccine supply during an outbreak of pandemic influenza, which are distinct  
 173 from vaccination campaigns conducted outside of outbreak or pandemic scenarios in terms of

174 goals and operationalization. These national plans are tailored to countries' own systems and  
175 resources and each influenza outbreak will differ in terms of specific clinical characteristics and  
176 distribution of the burden of disease across populations (Williams and Dawson, 2020). However,  
177 a review of pandemic vaccine prioritization strategies in 31 countries<sup>5</sup> found some  
178 commonalities. For instance, more than 80 percent had at least one vaccine priority group  
179 (Straetemans et al., 2007). All of those countries prioritized health care workers and almost all  
180 prioritized essential service providers and people at high risk. The authors noted that most of the  
181 public plans did not feature clear criteria for prioritization, which are critical for garnering public  
182 acceptance of a prioritization framework.

183 A more recent review looked at ethical arguments used to justify the prioritization of  
184 vaccine during an influenza pandemic based on literature published between 2005–2015,<sup>6</sup> much  
185 of which was informed implicitly or explicitly by interest in the ethics of vaccine allocation  
186 spurred by the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2003–2004) and H1N1 (2009)  
187 pandemics (Williams and Dawson, 2020). In this literature, the most commonly proposed group  
188 for priority was health care workers, followed by vaccine manufacturers, emergency service  
189 workers, and basic infrastructure workers (e.g., utility, transportation, food, law enforcement).  
190 Some literature prioritized certain age groups, people who are medically vulnerable or otherwise  
191 at “high risk,” or socially vulnerable groups—noting that the concept of vulnerability is  
192 employed frequently, but it is rarely defined or explained sufficiently. The most commonly cited  
193 goal of vaccination was to prevent illness or save lives, which was framed variously as benefiting  
194 the most individuals, maximizing quality-adjusted life years or minimizing years of life lost, or  
195 saving particular groups, including people who are vulnerable and stigmatized, people who are  
196 most likely to recover, younger people, or people most likely to contribute to minimizing the  
197 pandemic's impact or to contribute to society more broadly. A much less common approach was  
198 to prioritize vaccination of those most likely to be significant transmitters of infection. The ethics  
199 arguments used in the literature were largely focused on outcomes, in terms of maximizing a  
200 good or minimizing a harm. Many appealed to justice—which is sometimes framed as fairness or  
201 equity—and reciprocity. For instance, arguments based on distributive justice often called for

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<sup>5</sup> The 27 European Union (EU) member states and the four non-EU countries of the Global Health Security Action Group.

<sup>6</sup> One of the 40 articles was published in 2017.

202 giving priority to vulnerable groups, while appeals to reciprocity were used to justify priority  
 203 given to health care workers.

204 **LESSONS FROM GUIDANCE AND FRAMEWORKS FOR ALLOCATING SCARCE**  
 205 **RESOURCES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC**

206 In addition to lessons learned from prior mass vaccination campaigns, the committee’s  
 207 deliberations were informed by the goals, principles, and prioritization strategies set forth in  
 208 guidance and frameworks recently developed for the allocation of scarce resources during the  
 209 COVID-19 pandemic. Some of these frameworks are vaccine-specific, some are focused on in-  
 210 patient treatments, and others address the allocation of scarce medical resources more broadly.  
 211 This section provides an overview of these frameworks’ guiding ethical principles and (when  
 212 available) the criteria for prioritizing allocation of the vaccine to specific groups. Box 2  
 213 summarizes key guiding principles gleaned by the committee from these efforts.

214 **Ethical Frameworks for Allocating Scarce Medical Resources**

215 *Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of COVID-19*

216 In May 2020, a publication in the *New England Journal of Medicine* proposed a set of  
 217 ethical values to underpin recommendations for allocating scarce medical resources during the  
 218 COVID-19 pandemic (Emanuel et al., 2020).<sup>7</sup> Drawing on previous proposals about how to  
 219 allocate resources during scenarios of absolute scarcity, such as pandemics, the authors identify  
 220 four fundamental ethical values: (1) maximize benefit, (2) treat people equally, (3) promote and  
 221 reward instrumental value (i.e., providing benefit to others), and (4) give priority to the worst off.  
 222 Importantly, the authors maintain that none of these values should be used in isolation to  
 223 determine the allocation of resources; instead, fair allocation requires a multi-value framework  
 224 that can be tailored to specific settings and resources. Each of these values could be  
 225 operationalized in different ways in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a pandemic, the  
 226 most important ethical value is maximizing benefits of scarce resources, which could aim to save

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<sup>7</sup> This publication builds on the “complete lives system” for allocation of scarce medical interventions that was proposed by a subset of the authors in a 2009 publication. The system “prioritizes younger people who have not yet lived a complete life, and also incorporates prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental value principles” (Persad et al., 2009).

227 the greatest number of lives or to save the most life-years (e.g., by prioritizing people with the  
 228 best prognosis). The authors recommend that both of these factors should receive the highest  
 229 priority. They suggest that treating people equally would be best operationalized by random  
 230 selection among people with similar prognoses, because a first-come, first-served system is  
 231 inappropriate for a pandemic. Instrumental value can be promoted retrospectively by giving  
 232 priority to people who have saved other’s lives—for example, research participants and health  
 233 care workers—or prospectively by giving priority to people who are likely to save others in the  
 234 future, such as health care workers. Giving priority to the worst off could either be  
 235 operationalized by priority to the sickest patients or to younger patients who stand to lose the  
 236 most life-years. The authors use these four values to generate six recommendations for fair  
 237 allocation of resources during the COVID-19 pandemic:

238

- 239 • To maximize the benefit of limited resources, prioritization should balance two aims:  
 240 saving the greatest number of lives and maximizing improvements in people’s length of  
 241 life after treatment.
- 242 • By virtue of their instrumental value in the pandemic response, health care workers and  
 243 others who maintain critical infrastructure should be prioritized.
- 244 • For patients with similar prognoses, equality should be operationalized by random  
 245 allocation.
- 246 • Criteria for prioritization should be tailored to the specific resource that is scarce and  
 247 responsive to changing evidence.
- 248 • Research participants should be recognized by receiving some priority, but only as a  
 249 tiebreaker among those with similar prognoses.
- 250 • The same criteria for allocation should apply to people with and without COVID-19.

### 251 *Ethics of Creating a Resource Allocation Strategy During the COVID-19 Pandemic*

252 In a July 2020 article for *Pediatrics*, a group of bioethicists reviewed the fundamental  
 253 ethical principles that frequently underpin scarce resource allocation frameworks and interpreted  
 254 those principles in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Laventhal et al., 2020). They found  
 255 broad agreement that such frameworks should seek to provide “the greatest benefit to the greatest  
 256 number of individuals while the fewest resources are used” (Laventhal et al., 2020). Systems for

257 allocation should be fair, transparent, consistently applied, and mindful of socially vulnerable  
258 populations without making allocation decisions based solely on sociodemographic factors.  
259 Furthermore, allocation frameworks should integrate criteria from across multiple moral  
260 dimensions. The authors categorize five principles of allocation drawn from different  
261 frameworks with specific relevance to COVID-19:

262

- 263 1. Allocation frameworks should optimize the likelihood of benefit by allocating  
264 resources to those most likely to survive.
- 265 2. For people with similar likelihood of benefit, resources should be allocated to those  
266 with the greatest urgent or acute need.
- 267 3. Consider the absolute number of people who can be helped by available resources  
268 and maximize opportunities to help more people.
- 269 4. People who perform vital functions (e.g., health care workers, first responders) are  
270 prioritized for resource allocation as a tiebreaker in decisions between people with  
271 similar likelihood of survival.
- 272 5. When all other factors are equal, randomization should be used to prioritize the  
273 allocation of resources rather than a first-come, first-served process that can  
274 compound inequities.

275

276 When creating new resource allocation guidance during the COVID-19 context, the  
277 authors suggest the following guiding principles: (1) short-term survival (i.e., survival to  
278 discharge) is a reasonable criterion for prioritization; (2) first-come, first-serve systems should  
279 not be used to determine who receives scarce resources, and (3) to make decisions between  
280 people of equal priority with respect to other factors, people who perform vital functions should  
281 be prioritized to receive resources.

### 282 *WHO Policy Brief on Ethics and COVID-19: Resource Allocation and Priority Setting*

283 A policy brief by WHO's Working Group on Ethics and COVID-19 was developed to  
284 provide guidance on scarce resource allocation and priority setting, with the caveat that the  
285 allocation of different types of resources will likely be ethically justified by different principles  
286 or values (WHO Working Group on Ethics and COVID-19, 2020). This brief is distinct from the



287 WHO’s forthcoming guidance on the allocation of vaccine described in the next section.  
288 Broadly, the brief suggests that a fair process for allocating scarce resources should promote  
289 certain ethical values, including transparency of allocation decisions and prioritization criteria,  
290 inclusiveness of affected groups in the decision making process, consistent treatment of all  
291 persons in the same categories, and accountability of decision makers. In making decisions about  
292 prioritization, they highlight four key ethical considerations. The principle of equality can be  
293 used in allocating scarce resources to individuals or populations expected to derive the same  
294 benefit (e.g., to justify a lottery system). The principle of best outcomes (i.e., utility) can guide  
295 the allocation of scarce resources according to their potential to maximize good or minimize  
296 harm. Maximizing utility should be balanced with the principle of prioritizing the worst off; the  
297 latter can be used to justify the allocation to treat those in greatest medical need or protect those  
298 at greatest risk. Finally, the principle of prioritizing those “tasked with helping others” can apply  
299 to allocating resources to health care workers, for example. In the context of COVID-19 vaccine  
300 allocation specifically, the brief recommends prioritizing three categories of individuals or  
301 populations, with greater priority for those who are included in multiple categories: (1) people at  
302 greatest risk of becoming infected and seriously ill, (2) people who would prevent the greatest  
303 spread of the virus if vaccinated, and (3) people who have volunteered to participate in research  
304 to develop the vaccine. The first two categories are prioritized to maximize the benefit of the  
305 vaccine. The rationale for the third category is “reciprocal obligation to those who were  
306 voluntarily put at risk to aid in this effort,” although this group should not be prioritized over  
307 those at greatest risk.

308 *Nuffield Council on Bioethics Policy Brief on Fair and Equitable Access to COVID-19*  
309 *Treatments and Vaccines*

310 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has developed a policy brief that identifies key factors  
311 that determine fair and equitable access to COVID-19 treatments and vaccines (Nuffield Council  
312 on Bioethics, 2020). These factors include how research is prioritized and funded; how the  
313 burdens and benefits of that research is distributed between low- and high-income countries;  
314 structural and health inequalities that pose barriers to access, and public engagement and trust in  
315 the development and deployment of treatments and vaccines. In making difficult decisions about  
316 the allocation of resources that affect access, the authors suggest hewing to an ethical compass of

317 three broadly shared values: (1) ensuring equal respect, dignity, and human rights, (2) helping to  
318 reduce suffering of those who are sick or otherwise in need, and (3) maintaining fairness through  
319 both non-discriminatory treatment of others and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens.

## 320 **Ethical Frameworks for Allocating Scarce In-Patient Treatments for COVID-19**

321 After FDA issued an Emergency Use Authorization for the use of the antiviral remdesivir  
322 for patients with severe COVID-19 in May 2020, decisions about how to allocate remdesivir  
323 have been largely delegated to state health departments. However, many hospitals are operating  
324 without clear guidance about how to ethically allocate limited supplies of the medication to  
325 eligible patients (White and Angus, 2020). This issue will likely be compounded as more  
326 treatments for COVID-19 become available, but demand exceeds supply. In some states, such as  
327 New Jersey, advisory committees have recommended that remdesivir should be allocated to  
328 eligible patients on a first-come, first-served basis. However, other states and research groups are  
329 developing various types of ethical frameworks and policies to guide the fair allocation of scarce  
330 medications to treat COVID-19. Many of these allocation plans provide for some type of  
331 independent decision maker. Controversy has already emerged around some of these plans—  
332 particularly regarding the allocation of ventilators—with regard to their disparate impact based  
333 on patients’ race or disability status (Schmidt, 2020; Truog et al., 2020). Some plans have  
334 subsequently been revised to address these types of critiques.

### 335 *Minnesota’s Ethical Framework for Distributing Remdesivir*

336 In June 2020, the state of Minnesota developed an ethical framework for distributing  
337 remdesivir to facilities statewide and for prioritizing specific patients within each facility who  
338 are at greatest risk of mortality and serious morbidity, as well as those who would benefit from  
339 access to the drug (Lim et al., 2020).<sup>8</sup> The framework’s guiding ethical principles are to (1)  
340 responsibly allocate the scarce resource to reduce risk while providing benefit, (2) save the most  
341 lives possible while respecting rights and fairness, (3) promote the common good through  
342 transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness, and (4) use the best available evidence while  
343 addressing uncertainty. To ensure that the framework protects the rights and interests of all, the

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<sup>8</sup> The Ethical Framework to Allocate Remdesivir in the COVID-19 Pandemic (updated August 2020) is available at <https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/coronavirus/hcp/remdesivir.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).

344 approach rejected allocation based on race, ethnicity, gender or gender identity, citizenship or  
 345 immigration status, socioeconomic status, or ability to pay for treatment. Age, disability status,  
 346 and comorbid conditions are disallowed as criteria unless relevant to clinical prognosis and  
 347 likelihood of survival. To protect those at greatest risk while also maximizing remdesivir’s  
 348 benefit, it is allocated to patients based both on need and on likelihood of survival to hospital  
 349 discharge. The framework focuses on short-term rather than longer-term prognosis to avoid  
 350 disadvantaging people based on age, comorbid conditions, disabilities, or systemic health  
 351 inequities. The framework highlights the importance of obtaining patient consent, because  
 352 remdesivir was not FDA approved when the framework was developed and the drug has the  
 353 potential to cause serious adverse events. It is important to note that this framework is a living  
 354 document that will likely be updated as better data are available to guide the use of remdesivir.

355 *Pennsylvania’s Weighted Lottery System for Allocating Scarce Medications for COVID-19*

356 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has endorsed a weighted lottery system for ethically  
 357 allocating medications for COVID-19 to eligible patients in cases of shortage. This lottery  
 358 system is part of a model hospital policy,<sup>9</sup> developed by a multidisciplinary team at the  
 359 University of Pittsburgh, which is guided by the ethical duties to steward scarce resources in the  
 360 interest of public health and to mitigate the impact of social inequities on COVID-19 outcomes  
 361 in disadvantaged communities. This model policy recommends that hospitals create an allocation  
 362 team to unburden treating clinicians of the responsibility and potential moral distress of making  
 363 decisions about the allocation of scarce medications to their patients. The weighted lottery  
 364 system is designed to fairly allocate the supply of a medication for treating COVID-19 if it is  
 365 insufficient for the number of eligible patients, with certain groups receiving heightened priority:  
 366 (1) individuals who reside in disadvantaged areas, as defined by an address with an Area  
 367 Deprivation Index score of 8–10; and (2) individuals who are essential workers, as defined by the  
 368 state’s list of businesses required to continue physical operations during the pandemic. The latter  
 369 group includes health care workers, but also lower-paid workers who tend to be socially and  
 370 economically vulnerable (e.g., people employed in grocery stores, public transportation,

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<sup>9</sup> The Model Hospital Policy for Fair Allocation of Medications to Treat COVID-19 is available at <https://ccm.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/2020-05-28b%20Model%20hospital%20policy%20for%20allocating%20scarce%20COVID%20meds.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2020).

371 agriculture, and custodial work). Individuals who are expected to die within a year from an end-  
372 stage condition are not excluded from the lottery but receive lower priority than individuals  
373 without such conditions. Others have argued that lottery systems to allocate scarce medications  
374 for COVID-19 should be centralized and run by state health departments—rather than by  
375 individual hospitals—in order to expedite distribution and allow for the collection of larger  
376 volumes of pooled clinical data about the effectiveness of remdesivir or other scarce medications  
377 (White and Angus, 2020).

### 378 *Ethical Framework for Allocating Therapies to Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19*

379 Another ethical framework for allocating scarce inpatient medications for COVID-19 was  
380 developed by a group at the University of California, San Francisco, in May 2020. This  
381 framework was developed as a practical guide for clinicians and health care facilities faced with  
382 decisions about how to ethically allocate therapies to hospitalized patients with COVID-19,  
383 including existing therapies such as remdesivir, as well as novel treatments under development  
384 (e.g., monoclonal antibodies) (DeJong et al., 2020). The aims of this framework are to maximize  
385 benefit to patients, mitigate disparities, adhere to ethical principles, and revise allocation policies  
386 as more evidence becomes available. The guiding ethical principles of this framework are that  
387 reducing mortality provides benefit to the community as a whole and benefit should be assessed  
388 using the best available evidence. The framework holds that during a shortage, medications  
389 should be prioritized for indications with demonstrated efficacy and safety, ideally from  
390 randomized controlled trials. Patient preferences should be respected to the extent that the drug  
391 supply allows, and scarce medications should be allocated in a way that is fair, avoids  
392 discrimination, and mitigates health disparities. Allocation policies should be made transparent,  
393 accountable, responsive to the concerns of the affected population, and proportionate to the  
394 epidemiological situation and the drug supply relative to need. Prioritization in this framework  
395 does not exclude people based on age, disability, religion, race or ethnicity, national origin,  
396 gender, sexual orientation, or perceived quality of life or comorbid conditions. Random  
397 allocation (e.g., lottery) is deemed the fairest way to allocate scarce supplies among *eligible*  
398 patients—although workers in essential jobs may be assigned some priority—because a “first-  
399 come, first-serve” system is not random and puts people who face barriers to care at a  
400 disadvantage. An additional advantage of random lottery system is the potential for knowledge

401 generation, because a randomized sample could potentially be used to causally evaluate the  
 402 effect of being vaccinated on relevant outcomes. The authors also outline five goals that can be  
 403 derived from the ethical framework for allocating scarce therapies for COVID-19: (1) to save the  
 404 most lives in the short/near term, with additional goals of preventing new cases and reducing the  
 405 durations of hospitalization and mechanical ventilation; (2) to decrease disparities in COVID-19  
 406 case-fatality proportions that disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minority communities;  
 407 (3) to strengthen the community’s pandemic response ability; (4) to preserve a supply of existing  
 408 medications for non-COVID-19 indications that patients with chronic conditions may depend on;  
 409 and (5) to reserve enough of the therapy to conduct RCTs and develop a stronger evidence base  
 410 for effective therapies.

411

## **BOX 2**

### **Guiding Principles from Allocation Frameworks Developed for the COVID-19 Pandemic**

- Ensure that allocation maximizes benefit to patients, mitigates inequities and disparities, and adheres to ethical principles.
- Promote the common good through fairness, transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness.
- Save the greatest number of lives possible—while respecting rights and fairness—to maximize benefit to the community as a whole.
- Use the best available evidence to assess benefit to communities and address uncertainty.
- Allocate scarce resources responsibly to reduce risk while providing benefit.
- Provide clear and transparent criteria for prioritization strategies.
- Ensure that allocation policies are flexible, responsive to the concerns of the affected population, and proportionate to the epidemiological situation and the vaccine supply relative to need.

### **412 Allocation Frameworks Developed for Vaccine Allocation During the COVID-19 Pandemic**

413 This section outlines ethical frameworks developed specifically for vaccine allocation  
 414 during the COVID-19 pandemic, including an interim framework developed by a group at Johns

415 Hopkins University and forthcoming efforts from WHO and CDC. Table 1 summarizes the  
416 goals, ethical principles, and prioritization approaches of these vaccine-specific allocation  
417 frameworks. It is important to note that these frameworks were developed in the context of  
418 rapidly changing goals for vaccination (e.g., as schools began to reopen in August 2020) and  
419 evolving data about the SARS coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus and vaccine candidates.

420 *Interim Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation and Distribution in the United States*

421 In August 2020, Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Health Security released an  
422 interim framework for COVID-19 vaccine allocation and distribution in the United States that is  
423 framed by three broad ethical values: (1) promoting the common good, (2) treating people fairly  
424 and equally, and (3) promoting legitimacy, trust, and sense of ownership in a pluralistic society.  
425 In this framework, the ethical value of promoting the common good includes the more specific  
426 ethical principles of promoting public health (e.g., preventing illness and death and protecting  
427 health systems) as well as promoting economic and social well-being, which includes protection  
428 of essential services, supporting economic activity, and enabling children to return to school and  
429 childcare. Ethical principles falling under the broader value of treating people fairly and  
430 equitably include addressing background and emerging inequities experienced by disadvantaged  
431 and marginalized groups, giving priority to the worst off people at greatest risk of severe illness  
432 and death, and ensuring reciprocity to protect those who provide essential services and advance  
433 the development of treatments and vaccines. The third ethical value calls for respecting the  
434 diversity of views in a pluralistic society and engaging with communities to strengthen vaccine  
435 campaigns. Based on this ethical foundation, the framework suggests that the following groups  
436 should be candidates for high priority access to scarce vaccine, including provisional examples  
437 of the groups in each tier.

438 Tier 1 priority groups include:

439

- 440 • Those most essential in sustaining the ongoing COVID-19 response (e.g., frontline  
441 health workers, emergency services personnel, and public health workers; pandemic  
442 vaccine manufacturing and supply chain personnel; COVID-19 diagnostic and  
443 immunization teams)

- 444
- Those at greatest risk of severe illness and death, and their caregivers (e.g., adults  
445 aged  $\geq 65$  years; others at elevated risk of serious COVID-19 and complications;  
446 frontline long-term care providers and health care workers providing direct care to  
447 patients with high-risk conditions)
  - Those most essential to maintaining core societal functions (e.g., workers in frontline  
448 public transport, food supply, and schools)  
449

450

451 Tier 2 priority groups include:

452

- Those involved in broader health provision (e.g., health workers and staff with direct  
453 but non-COVID-19-specific patient contact; pharmacy staff)
- Those who face greater barriers to access care if they become seriously ill (e.g.,  
454 people living in remote locations with substandard infrastructure and health care  
455 access)  
456
- Those contributing to maintenance of core societal functions (e.g., frontline  
457 infrastructure workers who cannot work remotely; warehouse and delivery workers;  
458 deployed military involved in operations; police and fire personnel with frequent  
459 public contact; Transportation Security Administration and border security personnel  
460 with direct public contact)  
461
- Those whose living or working conditions give them elevated risk of infection, even  
462 if they have lesser or unknown risk of severe illness and death (e.g., people who are  
463 unable to maintain safe physical distance in their home or work environments,  
464 including people living in shelters, people who are incarcerated, and people who work  
465 in prisons)  
466  
467

468 *Multi-Value Ethical Framework for Fair Global Allocation of a COVID-19 Vaccine*

469 A group of authors from Vanderbilt University have developed a multi-value ethical  
470 framework for fair global allocation of a COVID-19 vaccine to different countries by analyzing

471 four types of allocation paradigms<sup>10</sup> and synthesizing their ethical principles into a model for the  
 472 COVID-19 pandemic (Liu et al., 2020). To promote fair vaccine allocation across countries of  
 473 different resource levels, the authors propose stratifying countries into groups for prioritization  
 474 based on three guiding ethical principles: (1) ability to provide care, (2) ability to implement, and  
 475 (3) reciprocity. The rationale for the first principle is that vaccines are the only effective  
 476 intervention in low-income countries lacking in capacity to treat people with severe COVID-19,  
 477 so those countries should receive priority. The rationale for the second principle is that vaccines  
 478 should not be allocated if they cannot be used, so low-income countries' capacities for  
 479 distribution and implementation should be supported. The third principle, reciprocity, prioritizes  
 480 countries based on their level of contribution and participation in developing and testing  
 481 vaccines.

#### 482 *WHO's Ongoing COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation Efforts*

483 WHO has several related global planning efforts under way for vaccine allocation,  
 484 including COVAX, guiding principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19  
 485 pandemic, and a global framework to ensure equitable and fair allocation of COVID-19  
 486 products, including vaccines (see Table 1). COVAX<sup>11</sup> is the vaccines pillar of the Access to  
 487 COVID Tools Accelerator,<sup>12</sup> a global initiative bringing together governments, health  
 488 organizations, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists to accelerate the  
 489 development and deployment of the key countermeasures needed to respond to the COVID-19  
 490 pandemic, including COVID-19 tests, therapeutics, and vaccines. The COVAX pillar's primary  
 491 goal is to accelerate the development and manufacture of vaccines and ensure equitable access  
 492 worldwide. COVAX is co-led by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI),  
 493 the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), and WHO. As of August 19, 2020,  
 494 GAVI, CEPI, and WHO were seeking representatives from civil society and community

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<sup>10</sup> The allocation paradigms considered include a country's ability to develop or purchase vaccine, reciprocity in prioritizing countries that contribute samples or have participants in research trials, countries' ability to deploy vaccine to its population, and distributive justice for developing countries.

<sup>11</sup> More information about COVAX is available at <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax> (accessed August 25, 2020).

<sup>12</sup> More information about the Access to COVID Tools Accelerator is available at [https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator#:~:text=The%20Access%20to%20COVID%2D19%20Tools%20\(ACT\)%20Accelerator%2C,tests%2C%20treatments%2C%20and%20vaccines](https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator#:~:text=The%20Access%20to%20COVID%2D19%20Tools%20(ACT)%20Accelerator%2C,tests%2C%20treatments%2C%20and%20vaccines) (accessed August 25, 2020).



495 organizations (CSOs) to participate in COVAX and help to foster the necessary support at both  
496 political and community-engagement levels to ensure equitable access and delivery of future  
497 COVID-19 vaccines.<sup>13</sup> The plan is for these CSOs to advocate for civil society and community  
498 perspectives and help build public trust and capacity across health care systems for COVID-19  
499 vaccination programs.

500         Within the COVAX pillar,<sup>14</sup> CEPI is leading the development and manufacturing of a  
501 portfolio of vaccine development partnerships. GAVI is leading the work on global procurement  
502 and financing through the COVAX Facility, which is designed to provide all countries with an  
503 opportunity to participate in securing initial access to vaccine supply sufficient to cover 20  
504 percent of their populations (per WHO’s allocation guidance). WHO leads the efforts pertaining  
505 to policy and vaccine allocation guidance, which informs the COVAX Facility’s procurement  
506 schemes. As of August 2020, WHO was working with its member states and the Strategic  
507 Advisory Group of Experts—which is the apical vaccine advisory body within WHO—to  
508 finalize the allocation framework for distribution of vaccines from COVAX between countries.  
509 The Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization, was established to serve as  
510 WHO’s principal advisory group on global policies and strategies for immunization and its link  
511 to other health interventions for all vaccine-preventable diseases. Their preliminary estimate is  
512 that distribution of enough vaccines for 20 percent of the population should be sufficient for each  
513 member state to immunize frontline health care workers, other essential workers, older adults,  
514 and those with significant comorbidities that increase the risk of serious COVID-19 illness in  
515 most countries. The current plan is to initially distribute enough vaccine for countries to cover 3  
516 percent of their respective populations, followed by vaccine to cover the additional 17 percent of  
517 the populations later. Within-country allocation decisions remain under the authority of each  
518 individual Member State. However, WHO/SAGE is developing an interim guidance on guiding  
519 principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is a values

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<sup>13</sup> See <https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/covax-seeks-civil-society-representatives-to-contribute-to-ensuring-equitable-global-access-to-covid-19-vaccines> (accessed August 25, 2020).

<sup>14</sup> Background information on the COVAX pillar is available at <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/COVAX-Pillar-background.pdf> (accessed August 13, 2020).

520 framework for within-country prioritization and other country-level decision making related to  
521 the provision of COVID-19 immunization.<sup>15</sup>

522 WHO's global framework to ensure equitable and fair allocation of COVID-19 products  
523 aims to reduce mortality due to COVID-19, protect health systems, improve the well-being of  
524 populations, and reduce the impact of the pandemic on societies and economies.<sup>16</sup> The  
525 framework has prioritized three populations: (1) health care system workers, who represent about  
526 1 percent of the global population (50 million people) and would require about 115 million  
527 doses;<sup>17</sup> (2) adults aged  $\geq 65$  years, who represent roughly 8 percent of the population (650  
528 million people) and would require about 1,500 million doses; and (3) other high-risk adults,  
529 who represent about 15 percent of the population (around 1.15 billion people) and would require  
530 about 2.65 billion doses. Additional prioritized groups would be based on risk assessment of the  
531 country's vulnerability and an estimated burden or threat of COVID-19. The guiding principles  
532 of the WHO allocation framework include transparency, ethical values, public health needs,  
533 collaboration with stakeholders, flexible and robust regulatory approaches, good governance and  
534 the "open scientific collaboration, transparency, and sharing of data and biological samples" that  
535 will be critical to the success of global vaccination efforts (Bollyky et al., 2020). Although WHO  
536 has shared the forthcoming framework's overarching principles for allocating COVID-19  
537 products, its detailed ethical justification for the vaccine allocation guidance had not yet been  
538 shared as of August 2020.

539 CDC's Ongoing COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation Efforts CDC's ACIP is currently  
540 developing a plan for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine in the United States. As a CDC  
541 federal advisory committee, ACIP provides recommendations on the use of vaccines in the  
542 United States civilian population and provides guidance on the optimal use of vaccines for the  
543 CDC and the Secretary of HHS. ACIP does not traditionally play a role in implementation (Lee

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<sup>15</sup> WHO's interim guidance on guiding principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19 pandemic (updated March 26, 2020) is available at <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/guiding-principles-for-immunization-activities-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-interim-guidance> (accessed August 13, 2020).

<sup>16</sup> The WHO Member States Briefing on a global framework to ensure equitable and fair allocation of COVID-19 products and potential implications for COVID-19 vaccines (June 18, 2020) is available at [https://apps.who.int/gb/COVID-19/pdf\\_files/18\\_06/Global%20Allocation%20Framework.pdf?utm\\_source=POLITICO.EU&utm\\_campaign=18fd118248-EMAIL\\_CAMPAIGN\\_2020\\_06\\_22\\_04\\_52\\_COPY\\_01&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_10959edeb5-18fd118248-189787901](https://apps.who.int/gb/COVID-19/pdf_files/18_06/Global%20Allocation%20Framework.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=18fd118248-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_06_22_04_52_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-18fd118248-189787901) (accessed August 13, 2020).

<sup>17</sup> The estimates of doses needed to vaccinate in this framework assume two doses per person and a 15 percent wastage rate.

544 et al., 2020). An ACIP COVID-19 Vaccine Workgroup was established in April 2020 to provide  
545 overarching guidance and vaccine-specific recommendations to CDC. The workgroup will  
546 evaluate available evidence and make recommendations, evaluate the likelihood that vaccines  
547 will reduce COVID-19 transmission, morbidity and mortality, and minimize disruption to  
548 society, and explore approaches to ensure equity in allocation. The ACIP workgroup has  
549 established three guiding principles to inform decision making: (1) safety, (2) diversity in clinical  
550 trials, which is necessary for diversity in vaccine allocation, and (3) efficient and equitable  
551 vaccine distribution. ACIP focuses on vaccine recommendations, rather than implementation; the  
552 latter will depend on partnerships with state and local public health entities. During their initial  
553 deliberations, proposed groups for prioritized allocation included health care workers, essential  
554 workers, adults aged  $\geq 65$  years, long-term care facility residents, and persons with high-risk  
555 medical conditions (Splete, 2020). More information about ACIP's efforts is provided in Table 1  
556 below.

557 **DRAFT TABLE 1** Overview of Ongoing COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation Efforts (*To be updated as more information becomes*  
558 *available.*)

<b>Effort</b>	<b>Leaders</b>	<b>Goals</b>	<b>Guiding Principles</b>	<b>Prioritized Groups</b>
COVAX	WHO CEPI GAVI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a process mechanism for between-country coordination and allocation.</li> <li>• Offer advance purchase agreements to vaccine candidates meeting technical threshold criteria.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mitigate economic damage.</li> <li>• Accelerate availability of vaccine.</li> <li>• Ensure globally fair allocation and access for Low- and Middle- Income Countries.</li> </ul>	Groups likely to be prioritized in first round of vaccination: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Health care system workers</li> <li>2. Adults aged <math>\geq 65</math> years</li> <li>3. Other high-risk adults with underlying conditions (e.g., hypertension, diabetes)</li> </ol>
Guiding principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19 pandemic	WHO SAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a values framework for within-country prioritization and decision making about immunization services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure continuity of routine immunization services during the COVID-19 pandemic (where feasible) to prevent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases.</li> </ul>	
Global Allocation Framework for COVID-19 Products	WHO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure equitable and fair allocation of COVID-19 products.</li> <li>• Issue policy recommendations to inform optimal use of scarce resources as more product-specific information becomes available.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce COVID-19 mortality and protect health systems to improve population well-being and reduce societal and economic impact.</li> <li>• Ensure flexibility to adapt to each new product, evolving epidemiology, and risk.</li> <li>• Use transparent criteria for allocating doses as they become available.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Health care workers</li> <li>2. Adults aged <math>\geq 65</math> years</li> <li>3. Other high-risk adults</li> </ol>
ACIP COVID-19 Vaccine Workgroup	ACIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop plan for allocation of vaccine in the United States</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor effectiveness and safety in real time to revise recommendations based on the risk/benefit balance in different populations.</li> <li>• Ensure diversity in vaccine clinical trials to ensure that recommendations are based on safety and efficacy data across all populations who may benefit.</li> </ul>	

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribute vaccines efficiently and equitably; avoid compounding inequities and disparities.</li> </ul>	
<p>Interim Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Allocation in the United States: Assisting Policy Maker, Stakeholder and Public Deliberation</p>	<p>Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide an interim framework for COVID-19 vaccine allocation and distribution in the United States</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote the common good</li> <li>• Treat people fairly and equally</li> <li>• Promote legitimacy, trust, and sense of ownership in a pluralistic society</li> </ul>	<p>Tier 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Those most essential in sustaining the ongoing COVID-19 response</li> <li>• Those at greatest risk of severe illness and death, and their caregivers</li> <li>• Those most essential to maintaining core societal functions</li> </ul> <p>Tier 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Those involved in broader health provision</li> <li>• Those who face greater barriers to access care if they become seriously ill</li> <li>• Those contributing to maintenance of core societal functions</li> <li>• Those whose living or working conditions give them elevated risk of infection, even if they have lesser or unknown risk of severe illness and death</li> </ul>

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
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## 617 A Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine

618 In this chapter—drawing from the lessons learned from other allocation frameworks  
 619 outlined in the prior chapter—the committee lays out the foundational principles that inform its  
 620 recommended COVID-19 vaccine allocation framework, and describes the primary goal of its  
 621 framework, the risk-based allocation criteria used to apply the principles, and the resulting  
 622 allocation phases (see Figure 1). The chapter concludes with an in-depth description and  
 623 discussion of the phases, including the rationale behind the inclusion of groups listed in each  
 624 phase.

625



626

627 **DRAFT FIGURE 1** Major elements of the framework for equitable allocation of COVID-19

628 vaccine



629

630 Numerous uncertainties about COVID-19 vaccine still exist that must eventually be  
631 addressed, and allocation and prioritization will likely depend on certain key vaccine  
632 characteristics. These uncertainties include the safety and efficacy of the vaccines in certain  
633 populations (such as children, pregnant women, older adults, and individuals previously infected  
634 with COVID-19); the effective use of vaccines in tandem with existing preventive measures;  
635 public confidence in the vaccine; the ability to adapt plans based on pharmacovigilance; and  
636 others.

637 Such uncertainties require the framework to be adaptable to a variety of circumstances,  
638 including the state of the pandemic when a vaccine becomes available. Designing the framework  
639 to be adaptable to a range of possible circumstances means that the committee must consider  
640 how the framework would operate ethically and effectively in a range of plausible scenarios.  
641 Planning is crucial, but a rigid framework is unlikely to match the specific circumstances that  
642 actually emerge, and will likely change depending on the goal of the vaccination program, the  
643 state of the pandemic, the state of the science, and the extent to which people are engaging in  
644 social distancing and other preventive measures. The following chapter describes several such  
645 scenarios and their implications for the framework. Likewise, the framework must be  
646 implementable. To be able to guide policy makers in planning for vaccine allocation, it must be  
647 feasible to put the framework into operation. For example, for individuals or groups prioritized to  
648 receive the vaccine, it must be possible to identify them accurately and quickly.

649 One-third or more of the U.S. population may decline a free and U.S. Food and Drug  
650 Administration (FDA-approved) vaccine for the novel coronavirus (Mullen O’Keefe, 2020).  
651 Concerns about inclusion and diversity in COVID-19 vaccine trials (Jaklevic, 2020) and  
652 uncertainties like those previously noted compound the already significant doubts that some  
653 members of the public have about the vaccine. The committee’s framework for vaccine  
654 allocation cannot address the general lack of confidence in vaccination. A mass vaccination  
655 program for public health will fail if there is widespread public mistrust. The committee believes  
656 that the equitable allocation framework that it recommends, if properly implemented and  
657 communicated, can secure public trust by being based on foundational principles that are simple,  
658 clear, coherent, and consistent in their application. The hope is that an equitable allocation

659 framework will gain public trust, by providing benefit to individuals and communities, thereby  
 660 mitigating the damage caused by the pandemic and aggravated by existing health inequities.

## 661 **FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FRAMEWORK**

662 The committee was charged with developing an overarching framework for the equitable  
 663 allocation of COVID-19 vaccine. This framework is intended to assist and guide policy makers  
 664 in planning for vaccine allocation under conditions of scarcity that will necessitate vaccinating  
 665 persons in phases over time. In presenting the sponsor’s charge at the committee’s first meeting  
 666 on July 24, 2020, the director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Dr. Francis Collins,  
 667 stressed that the overarching framework should include “foundational principles.” Such  
 668 principles, which are summarized and explicated below, informed the committee’s deliberations  
 669 about allocation criteria.

670 The committee recognizes that its proposed framework must not only be equitable but  
 671 also be *perceived* as equitable by audiences who are socioeconomically, culturally and  
 672 educationally diverse, and who have distinct historical experiences with the health system. As a  
 673 result, the framework’s public face must do justice to its scientific and ethical foundations.  
 674 Therefore, the committee has designed the framework so that it:

- 675
- 676 • Can be easily and equally well understood by the diverse audiences whose concerns
  - 677 the vaccine allocation scheme must address;
  - 678 • Reflects widely accepted social and ethical principles;
  - 679 • Can be reliably translated into operational terms;
  - 680 • Distinguishes scientific and ethical judgments in their application; and
  - 681 • Does not perpetuate discrimination and inequities.

### 682 **Foundational Principles**

683 The foundational principles for the equitable allocation framework for COVID-19  
 684 vaccine include ethical and other principles embedded in U.S. social institutions and culture (see  
 685 Box 3). The committee recognized that the principles required for its deliberations had to be

686 solid and broad enough to urgently address a pandemic of a magnitude not seen in a century with  
687 disastrous effects not only on the public’s health for persons with COVID-19 and other health  
688 problems and their communities but also on the economy, education, and other central aspects of  
689 society.

690 The committee immediately invoked a principle of *maximization of benefits* that sets an  
691 primary goal of maximizing societal benefit through the reduction of morbidity and mortality  
692 caused by the transmission of the novel coronavirus. While spread throughout the society, the  
693 pandemic’s damage has more significantly harmed some populations more than others,  
694 particularly causing higher rates of infection, serious illness, hospitalization, and death among  
695 people of color. This reality led the committee to formulate a principle of *mitigation of health*  
696 *inequities* to address the higher risks faced by such persons in certain work environments and  
697 living arrangements which correspond to higher risk of transmitting and acquiring infection and  
698 with having a higher prevalence of certain health problems that make it more likely that they will  
699 suffer severe outcomes and even die from COVID-19. In tragic choices about vaccine allocation,  
700 the principle of *equal regard* directs attention to the equal worth and value of every person,  
701 protecting each one from discrimination, while the principle of *fairness* requires impartiality and  
702 the engagement and participation of affected populations in setting allocation criteria and  
703 determining priority groups. Furthermore, the principle of *transparency* ensures the disclosure of  
704 the principles, criteria, and priority groups that will determine people’s chances of getting a  
705 vaccine sooner rather than later. Finally, none of these principles can accomplish its goals  
706 without the principle that all decisions must be *evidence-based*.

707 Not unexpectedly, these principles overlap substantially with those in other frameworks  
708 for the allocation of scarce medical and public health goods, including vaccines for pandemic  
709 influenza (Williams and Dawson, 2020). Virtually every such framework has a principle like the  
710 committee’s on the maximization of benefits. Most frameworks also include principles like the  
711 committee’s relating to equality and to equity, fairness, and justice (Emanuel et al., 2020;  
712 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2020; Persad et al., 2009; Toner et al., 2020; Williams and  
713 Dawson, 2020). These frameworks vary in how clusters of ethical considerations are combined  
714 into primary principles and the weight assigned to those principles.

715 In seeking a set of foundational principles to guide its deliberations, the committee  
 716 identified the following principles as both necessary and sufficient for formulating vaccine  
 717 allocation criteria and their implementation in phases of vaccine allocation. These principles,  
 718 which are unranked, do not reflect any specific ethical theory, but are consonant with many and  
 719 grounded in U.S. social values and cultural discourse.  
 720

**BOX 3**

**Foundational Principles for Equitable Allocation**

- Maximization of benefits
- Equal Regard
- Mitigation of health inequities
- Fairness
- Evidence-based
- Transparency

721 *Maximization of Benefits*

722 This principle encompasses the obligation to protect and promote the public’s health and  
 723 its socioeconomic well-being in the short- and long-run. In this pandemic, it entails the  
 724 obligation, as previously noted, to *maximize societal benefit by reducing morbidity and mortality*  
 725 *caused by transmission of the novel coronavirus*. Meeting this obligation constitutes the  
 726 overarching goal of the committee’s proposed allocation framework. Societal benefit is broadly  
 727 understood in this context (public’s health and socioeconomic well-being). While it includes  
 728 individuals’ health and well-being, the committee recognizes that conflicts may emerge between  
 729 the society’s and the individuals’ needs and risks and require resolution. The framework the  
 730 committee proposes seeks to combine them to the extent possible.

731 The vaccine allocation framework thus seeks to reduce the risks of severe morbidity and  
 732 mortality caused by transmission due to the novel coronavirus for those (a) most at risk of  
 733 infection and serious outcomes, (b) in roles considered to be essential for societal functioning,  
 734 and (c) most at risk of transmitting the coronavirus to others. Individuals in these roles include:

735

736

- Those whose work puts them at additional risk of infection; and

737

- Those whose absence from their societal roles or work puts others and the society at

738

risk of loss of needed goods and services if they become infected (e.g., physicians,

739

nurses, other health care providers, first responders, workers employed in the food

740

supply system, transportation workers, teachers, etc.).

741

742

The interconnection between protecting and promoting the public’s health and

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socioeconomic quality of life is generally understood and appreciated. However, it can be

744

difficult scientifically to determine the best way to achieve both aims through vaccine allocation

745

and other measures. Given present scientific knowledge, it is also difficult to determine the most

746

effective combination of focusing vaccine allocation on reducing morbidity and mortality versus

747

reducing transmission of COVID-19. Making those determinations wisely will require accurate,

748

evidence-based assessments of the state of the pandemic and the available vaccine.

749

### *Equal Regard*

750

The government’s obligation to express equal regard to residents should both guide and

751

constrain its allocation and distribution of goods, such as vaccines, and burdens, such as delays

752

in the provision of vaccines. This fundamental obligation requires that everyone be considered

753

and treated as having equal dignity, worth, and value. It presupposes that no one person is

754

intrinsically more valuable or worthy of regard than another. It entails treatment as an equal

755

rather than, automatically, an equal share (several versions of an egalitarian principle appear in

756

Emanuel et al., 2020; Persad et al., 2009; and Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2020).

757

The principle of equal regard retains its force even when it is necessary and ethically

758

justifiable to ration vaccines and other health related goods under conditions of scarcity. It

759

requires allocation and distribution by criteria that are non-discriminatory in design and impact.

760

It excludes rationing based on criteria such as religion, race, ethnicity, national origin, etc. The

761

moral right to equal regard and concern requires that allocation of vaccine proceed impartially

762

according to fair criteria as will be further specified below. Moreover, the requirement of equal

763

regard does not preclude consideration of people’s social roles in such allocations. Some social

764 roles are essential in this pandemic to ensure the provision of necessary goods and services to the  
765 community and to individuals, including but not limited to medical care. This means that the  
766 people filling those roles may legitimately gain priority (e.g., clinicians, emergency responders,  
767 food processors) in those circumstances.

768 If the supply of vaccine is too limited to provide it to everyone in a particular priority  
769 population group at the same time, the principle of equal regard supports random selection (e.g.,  
770 lottery) within that population group. It can also support a weighted lottery<sup>18</sup> for vaccine  
771 allocation as it has for the allocation of COVID-19 therapies such as remdesivir (White et al.,  
772 2020).

### 773 *Mitigation of Health Inequities*

774 The obligation to mitigate health inequities and their effects has become particularly  
775 salient in this pandemic. COVID-19 infections and deaths are strongly associated with race,  
776 ethnicity, occupation, and socioeconomic status. A significantly higher burden is experienced by  
777 Black, Hispanic or Latinx, and American Indian and Alaska Native populations. Currently there  
778 is no evidence that this is biologically mediated, but rather the impact of systemic racism leading  
779 to higher rates of comorbidities that increase the severity of COVID-19 infection and the  
780 socioeconomic factors that increase likelihood of acquiring the infection (front line jobs,  
781 crowded living conditions, lack of access to personal protective equipment (PPE), inability to  
782 work from home, etc.). A significantly higher burden is also experience by individuals who hold  
783 jobs with high transmission risk that cannot be done from home and often are poorly paid. These  
784 groups also experience disproportionately large burdens of other adverse health conditions.  
785 Many factors contribute to these health inequities, defined as “systematic differences in the  
786 health status of different population groups” (WHO, 2017) (see Box 4). Fundamental health  
787 inequities in COVID-19 and in other health conditions are rooted in structural inequalities,  
788 racism, and residential segregation. Any vaccine allocation scheme designed to reduce COVID-  
789 19 risk must explicitly address the higher burden of COVID-19 experienced by the populations  
790 affected most heavily, given their exposure and compounding health inequities. Mitigating those

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<sup>18</sup> A weighted lottery system could be used to fairly allocate the scarce supply of vaccine with certain groups receiving heightened priority.

791 health inequities is, therefore, a moral imperative of an equitable vaccine allocation system. In  
 792 addition, any vaccine allocation plan implemented at the federal and state levels must respect the  
 793 tribal sovereignty of American Indian and Alaska Native nations.

794

**BOX 4**

**Health Inequities**

795

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797

798 The World Health Organization defines health inequities as “*systematic differences in the health*  
 799 *status of different population groups [...] which have significant social and economic costs both*  
 800 *to individuals and societies*” (WHO, 2017). Health inequities arise from social, economic,  
 801 environmental, and structural disparities that contribute to intergroup differences in health  
 802 outcomes both within and between societies. A 2017 report of the National Academies of  
 803 Sciences Engineering and Medicine identified two root causes of health inequities:

804

805 • **Structural inequities**, or the “*systemic disadvantage of one social group compared to other*  
 806 *groups with whom they coexist, and which encompasses policy, law, governance, and*  
 807 *culture and refers to race, ethnicity, gender or gender identity, class, sexual orientation, and*  
 808 *other domains*” (NASEM, 2017).

809 • **Social determinants of health**, or the “*conditions in the environments in which people live,*  
 810 *learn, work, play, worship, and age that affect a wide range of health, functioning, and quality*  
 811 *of-life outcomes and risks*” (NASEM, 2017).

812

813 The interplay between these two root causes can lead to systematic differences in the  
 814 opportunities certain communities have to achieve optimal health, leading to unfair and  
 815 avoidable differences in health outcomes (Braveman, 2006; WHO, 2017)

816

817 Thus, the vaccine allocation criteria should mitigate the negative effects of existing health  
 818 inequities on the transmission of and harms from the novel coronavirus. The committee’s  
 819 allocation criteria do so in part by taking into account to the “vulnerability” of

820

- 821           • People at increased risk of infection because of social conditions, such as working  
822           conditions and living in multigenerational homes<sup>19</sup>; and
- 823           • People at increased risk of severe outcomes because of comorbid conditions that often  
824           result from or are worsened by social determinants, limited access to health care, etc.

825

826           These allocation criteria identify people who are considered to be the most disadvantaged  
827           or the “worst off” because of conditions of ill health or social deprivation or both that could  
828           make them more susceptible to infection or severe outcomes. Such criteria are often called  
829           “prioritarian” because of the primary place assigned to the “worst off” (Emanuel et al., 2020;  
830           Toner et al., 2020). A further way to mitigate the effects of health inequities is to incorporate  
831           some metric of social disadvantage, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions  
832           (CDC’s) Social Vulnerability Index<sup>20</sup>, into the prioritization of vaccine recipients by making it an  
833           additional consideration within the phases.

834           Ultimately, the mitigation of health inequities includes development and deployment of  
835           distribution systems that ensure that people who are allocated a vaccine actually receive it (e.g.,  
836           by taking it to where they are) and can afford it, even if they are hard to reach.

### 837 *Fairness*

838           The principle of fairness includes the obligation to develop allocation criteria based only  
839           on relevant non-discriminatory characteristics, already noted under the principle of equal regard,  
840           to apply these criteria impartially, and to employ fair procedures in allocation and distribution.  
841           The principle of fairness here entails formulating criteria focused on individual, community, and  
842           social needs and risks, and vigilantly avoiding the sometimes conventional practices that create  
843           and sustain discrimination.

844           Questions often arise about fair rationing when age is involved. This committee has been  
845           clear that it does not use age as a criterion of allocation, but only as a predictor of heightened (1)  
846           risk of acquiring infection, (2) risk of severe outcomes of infection, or (3) risk of transmission to

<sup>19</sup> Multigenerational homes consist of more than two generations living under the same roof.

<sup>20</sup> CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index was developed for local preparedness for public health emergencies such as natural disasters and disease outbreaks, identifies geographic areas of vulnerability based on 15 census variables. These variables capture many recognized social determinants of health, indicators of access, infection transmission, increased risk of adverse COVID-19 outcomes (ATSDR, 2018).



847 others. Given the currently available evidence about the pandemic’s behavior, priority for older  
848 adults in certain phases, if warranted, would probably be based mainly on risk of severe  
849 outcomes of infection, whereas priority for young adults, if warranted, would probably be based  
850 mainly on risk of transmission to others.. The conflict is not so direct between these two  
851 populations in the current pandemic because children who are infected with the novel  
852 coronavirus and can transmit it tend not to have such severe outcomes as older adults. If such a  
853 direct conflict existed because of widespread severe outcomes among children, there would be  
854 strong arguments for prioritizing children over older adults on the basis of severe outcomes.  
855 Children would be “worse off” because of the years of life they would lose, older adults have had  
856 their “fair innings,” and so forth (Daniels, 2008; Emanuel and Wertheimer, 2006; Emanuel et al.,  
857 2020; Kamm, 1993; Williams, 1997). In the current context, the more difficult conflict to resolve  
858 is between reducing transmission among children in order to make it more likely that they can  
859 attend school in person and to reduce transmission to others in the community, on the one hand,  
860 and reducing severe illness and death among older adults, on the other hand.

861 A related debate about age concerns the loss of life years versus the loss of life. Older  
862 adults in their eighties, for instance, generally lose fewer life years if they die than children or  
863 young adults who die. However, given the large numbers of older adults who die from COVID-  
864 19, those numbers multiplied by fewer life years can still end up being quite substantial.  
865 Resolving these conflicts depends on evidence about the relative effectiveness of different  
866 vaccine strategies at particular stages in the pandemic give available supplies of vaccine, as will  
867 be examined later in this chapter.

868 Fairness should guide not only the formulation of allocation criteria, but also their  
869 application, which should be impartial and evenhanded, and avoid arbitrary exceptions and  
870 gaming. Implementation should be as uniform as possible across the country, consistent with  
871 allowing discretion to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities to address specific  
872 patterns of COVID-19 transmission, extent of spread, and severity of outcomes. Unless clearly  
873 communicated and justified, extreme variation in applying the criteria can evoke charges of  
874 unfairness.

875 Procedural fairness is also crucial. This means that decisions about allocation,  
876 distribution, and access to vaccine should incorporate input from affected groups, especially

877 those disproportionately affected. Decisions about whether a group has heightened risk and  
878 which individuals fall in that particular group should be data-driven and made by impartial  
879 decision makers, such as public health officials. Ideally, affected individuals and communities  
880 should be able to appeal decisions, and in doing so, the committee believes that the transparency  
881 of its principles will help adjudicate those subsequent debates.

882         Reciprocity, defined as rewarding people for their past contributions, is sometimes  
883 presented as an additional ethical principle, in part to account for common intuitions about  
884 certain situations, particularly giving priority to vaccine clinical trial participants who received a  
885 placebo or an ineffective vaccine. The committee agrees with the common practice of post-trial  
886 access for research participants but believes that this is covered by the principle of fairness.

### 887 *Evidence-Based*

888         Vaccination phases—who receives the vaccine when—should be based on the best  
889 available evidence and models for identifying the populations most likely to become seriously ill  
890 or die without vaccination, for determining when slowing the pandemic is best accomplished  
891 with a focus on those most likely to spread the infection, and for estimating the added effect of  
892 vaccination on transmission in public and crowded settings. The framework must be adaptive,  
893 capable of being changed as the understanding of the disease and its risk factors deepens, and as  
894 vaccines become available, especially if some are more useful for particular populations than  
895 others. Models and their inputs will be revised as the pandemic and available information  
896 evolves. The criteria used to identify categories of individuals or groups for each phase will  
897 evolve accordingly but will at all times be stated clearly and applied in a neutral fashion.

### 898 *Transparency*

899         The principle of transparency includes the obligation to communicate with the public  
900 openly, clearly, accurately, and straightforwardly about the vaccine allocation criteria and  
901 framework, as they are being developed and deployed. Central to this process is clear articulation  
902 and explanation of the allocation criteria. Those explanations must include the principles  
903 underlying these criteria, as grounded in widely accepted societal institutions and culture, as well  
904 as the procedures for ensuring their faithful implementation.

905 Sometimes governments present vaccine allocation criteria without explicitly or  
906 adequately explaining their grounding in principles. This is a mistake in at least two ways. First,  
907 the public has a legitimate reason to expect such a justification when criteria affect when they  
908 can receive a vaccination, especially when their government funds the vaccine program. Second,  
909 such communication is essential to generating and sustaining public trust in the vaccine  
910 allocation criteria and program.

911 Transparency should also extend to other aspects of procedural fairness. Individuals (or  
912 their trusted surrogates) must be able to observe, understand, and monitor how the program's  
913 procedures are formulated and applied. That will require simple, clearly defined, and  
914 comprehensibly communicated rules. It will also require accessible documentation of how the  
915 allocation system performs and how it responds to the unanticipated consequences inevitable  
916 with such a complex human enterprise.

917 Without transparency regarding the allocation criteria, their ethical rationale, the  
918 deliberative process used to formulate them, and fair procedures, it will be difficult to generate  
919 and maintain the trust that is indispensable for the public's cooperation with a mass vaccination  
920 program.

921 To achieve transparency, it is necessary to ensure that the program's principles and  
922 operations are accessible and comprehensible to all those affected by it. This cannot be done  
923 without empirically testing proposed communications in two essential ways: Can people find a  
924 program's procedures and guiding principles easily, following their normal search patterns? Can  
925 they interpret them in ways that inform their evaluations regarding the legitimacy of the program  
926 and their own vaccination choices?

### 927 *Using the Principles*

928 Each pandemic has what Yale historian Frank Snowden calls its distinctive "personality"  
929 (Snowden, 2019), that is, its distinctive characteristics of disease and rates of infection, its modes  
930 of transmission, the groups and individuals most susceptible to infection, ages most affected,  
931 varying rates of severity and mortality, etc. Determining the specific criteria for vaccine  
932 allocation will require attention to up-to-date scientific information about the pandemic, on the  
933 one hand, and to foundational principles, on the other. These principles need to be specified and  
934 applied in the process of developing vaccine allocation criteria and phases to match the features

935 of the pandemic, along with the characteristics, supply, safety, and efficacy of any available  
936 vaccines.

937         This is evident, to take just one example, in applications of the principle of *maximization*  
938 *of benefits* and the primary goal it sets for vaccine allocation. Determining how best to protect  
939 and promote the public’s health and socioeconomic well-being, both immediate and long-term,  
940 while the vaccine is being phased in before becoming available to everyone in the society  
941 requires solid scientific evidence (principle of *evidence-based*) in the several ways previously  
942 noted. Similar points apply to the principles of *mitigation of health inequities*, *equal regard*, and  
943 *fairness* as well as to *transparency*. In the final analysis, each proposed allocation criterion and  
944 its proposed weight or strength must pass scrutiny in light of all of these principles. To be sure,  
945 conflicts may appear and require resolution, even necessitating trade-offs. Possible conflicts  
946 notwithstanding, these principles provide the foundation for the allocation criteria and the phases  
947 in vaccine allocation derived from them. The overall allocation framework reflects the  
948 committee’s best judgment about how to balance sometimes conflicting aims as the pandemic  
949 evolves and vaccine becomes incrementally available over time.

## 950                                   **COVID-19 VACCINE ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK**

### 951                                   **Primary Goal of the Framework**

952         Previous proposals for allocation of scarce resources in pandemics and other settings  
953 articulate various overarching goals to guide allocation that are focused on aspects of reducing  
954 morbidity and mortality, reducing disease transmission, minimizing societal disruptions,  
955 maintaining national security, and mitigating health inequities. For example, the 2018 CDC  
956 guidance document, *Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine During an Influenza*  
957 *Pandemic* states that its overarching goals are to reduce the impact of the pandemic on health and  
958 minimize the disruption to society and the economy.

959         Emanuel and colleagues (2020) recommended that in the context of a pandemic, such as  
960 COVID-19, the principle of maximization of benefits is most important and reflects the  
961 importance of responsible stewardship of scarce, valuable resources. Therefore, the primary goal  
962 of the committee’s framework on equitable allocation of COVID-19 vaccine derives from the  
963 ethical principle of maximization of benefits, which is:

964

965

**“Maximize societal benefit by reducing morbidity and mortality caused by transmission of the novel coronavirus.”**

966

967

968

The primary goal of the committee’s allocation framework has a dual focus:

969

maximization of benefit through prevention of morbidity and mortality and through reduction in

970

transmission. Moreover, the framework attempts to mitigate health inequities and is informed by

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the current evidence. In the early phases, prevention of morbidity and mortality, and maintenance

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of health and emergency services to aid prevention of morbidity and mortality is emphasized

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more than the reduction in transmission;<sup>21</sup> with an increased focus on transmission in later

974

phases.

975

There are multiple reasons for this approach.

976

977

- Morbidity and mortality are clearly identified and provide a logical and understandable start to selecting the first vaccine recipients.

978

979

- Any substantive impact of vaccination on reducing transmission would require a critical mass of individuals to be vaccinated. Even if this critical mass is lower than the nominal herd immunity threshold, in the early phases of vaccine deployment, there will not be sufficient courses of the vaccine available for an effective transmission-focused strategy.

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- The ongoing COVID-19 vaccine trials are not designed to estimate the impact of the vaccine candidates on transmission and evidence of the vaccines’ impact on transmission might not be available for some time after approval or authorization.

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- While data on all aspects of COVID-19 are emerging, data on transmission risk groups (e.g., by age, profession etc.) is particularly limited.

988

989

- There are legitimate claims for many groups (such as school children, “non-essential” workers important for the economy) to be in earlier phases as damage could occur if these groups are not prioritized. For example, there might be a substantial impact on

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<sup>21</sup> For clarification, the committee considered transmission in terms of transmitting infection to others and not acquiring infection.

992 the economy if a primarily transmission focused strategy is not employed from the  
993 outset. However, while the non-trivial effects of an economic downturn or an online  
994 semester can at least be partially reversed, death is the most irreversible outcome.

- 995 • Preventing severe morbidity and mortality indirectly protects the health care system  
996 (i.e., an overwhelmed health care may have an impact on excess morbidity and  
997 mortality).

998  
999 A focus on preventing mortality and severe morbidity in the initial phases does not mean  
1000 vaccinating only groups at a direct risk of these outcomes. Prevention of transmission to groups  
1001 at a high risk of morbidity and mortality should also be a part of the early phases of the vaccine  
1002 program. For example, vaccinating nursing home workers would protect the high-risk residents  
1003 of these facilities—particularly if the vaccine efficacy is lower among the elderly compared to  
1004 younger individuals. Moreover, as more courses of vaccines become available, an increasing  
1005 focus on reducing transmission, starting with high transmission settings and moving to the  
1006 general population, would ensure sustainable long-term control of COVID-19. Focusing on  
1007 health care and emergency workers in the initial phases will help mitigate the pandemic’s impact  
1008 on morbidity and mortality due to disruptions in the health care system.

1009 Ultimately, the U.S. COVID-19 vaccination program should aim to vaccinate all who  
1010 choose to be vaccinated and are without medical contraindications to the vaccine.

### 1011 **Allocation Criteria**

1012 The ethical principle of transparency, as well as the practical requirement of efficient,  
1013 consistent administration of the framework have led the committee to develop risk-based criteria  
1014 for operationalizing the foundational principles to achieve its primary goal (see Box 5). After  
1015 presenting these criteria briefly, this section discusses their compatibility with the foundational  
1016 principles, practical aspects of implementation, and their likely implications for allocation as  
1017 vaccines becomes increasingly available. The committee notes that the fidelity of the allocation  
1018 process to these foundational principles and criteria depends on the availability of data, as well as  
1019 the resolution of the uncertainties discussed earlier. Achieving this goal requires comprehensive,  
1020 consistent data collection that includes the needed variables of race/ethnicity, age, gender, and

1021 social status. The section below on the allocation framework provides operational definitions of  
1022 these criteria, suiting to current and emerging evidence regarding the disease, the vaccine, and  
1023 their impact on society.  
1024

**BOX 5**

**Risk-Based Criteria**

- Risk of acquiring infection: Individuals have higher priority to the extent that they have a greater probability of being in settings where COVID-19 is circulating and exposure to a sufficient dose of the virus.
- Risk of severe morbidity and mortality: Individuals have higher priority to the extent that they have a greater probability of severe disease or death if they acquire infection.
- Risk of negative societal impact: Individuals have higher priority to the extent that societal function and other individuals' lives and livelihood depend on them directly and would be imperiled if they fell ill.
- Risk of transmitting disease to others: Individuals have higher priority to the extent that there is a higher probability of their transmitting the disease to others.

1025 *Risk of Acquiring Infection*

1026 Individuals have higher priority to the extent that they have a greater probability of being  
1027 in settings where COVID-19 is circulating and exposure to a sufficient dose of the virus to  
1028 become infected.

1029 *Risk of Severe Morbidity and Mortality*

1030 Individuals have higher priority to the extent that they have a greater probability of severe  
1031 disease or death should they acquire infection.

1032 *Risk of Negative Societal Impact*

1033 Individuals have higher priority to the extent that societal function and other individuals'  
1034 lives and livelihood depend on them directly and would be imperiled if they fell ill. This risk is  
1035 interpreted through the number of other people potentially affected. It does not consider their

1036 wealth, income, or other factors. It does not consider how readily an individual could be replaced  
1037 in a work setting, given labor market conditions.

1038 *Risk of Transmitting Infection to Others*

1039 Individuals have higher priority to the extent that there is a higher probability of their  
1040 transmitting the infection to others. This risk reflects individuals' interactions with others, given  
1041 their normal course of life and their material, physical, and social resources. It is important to  
1042 note that there is limited data on differential transmissibility.

1043 **Compatibility of Allocation Criteria with Foundational Principles**

1044 *Maximization of Benefits*

1045 Each of the four types of risk reflects a threat to the public's health and socioeconomic  
1046 well-being. Reducing each risk would bring such benefits in the short and long run. These risk-  
1047 based criteria expressed the foundational principles in terms that are further specified in the  
1048 allocation phases that follow.

1049 *Equal Regard*

1050 These criteria treat all people equally. They make no reference to who people are, just to  
1051 their circumstances, what social roles they fill and what personal challenges they face (e.g.,  
1052 health). If more vaccine goes to members of one population group than another, it will not reflect  
1053 who they are, but what they do, and what has happened in their lives.

1054 *Mitigation of Health Inequities*

1055 Although the criteria do not directly address health inequities, the first criterion addresses  
1056 them indirectly insofar as those inequities have increased individuals' risk of disease (e.g., social  
1057 disadvantage is linked to having more disease and more severe disease). The second criterion  
1058 addresses them indirectly insofar as workers who have been subject to health inequities play  
1059 essential roles in jobs with greater exposure. The third criterion addresses them indirectly insofar  
1060 as those individuals are more likely to live in dense settings. A measure such as CDC's Social  
1061 Vulnerability Index could identify people in geographic areas who have suffered health  
1062 inequities that put them at greater risk.



1063 *Fairness*

1064           These criteria focus solely on four forms of risk, with no explicit recognition of any other  
 1065 individual characteristics. The committee anticipates that the criteria will, in practice, tend to  
 1066 give higher priority to lower-income individuals (because it is they who more frequently live in  
 1067 high-density settings, work in jobs that cannot be done without having personal contact with  
 1068 others, and have multiple comorbidities due to their circumstances and their relative lack of  
 1069 access to health care) and Black, Hispanic or Latinx, and American Indian and Native Alaskan  
 1070 communities given the ways in which these risks disproportionately affect people in these  
 1071 groups.

1072 *Evidence-Based*

1073           These three risk-based criteria apply well-understood analytical procedures to the best  
 1074 available scientific evidence (NRC, 1983, 1994, 2009). They can readily incorporate new  
 1075 evidence as it becomes available and characterize uncertainties in ways that can guide future data  
 1076 collection. Their application in the allocation phases reflects the committee’s assessment of the  
 1077 evidence regarding how vaccines can best maximize benefits to individuals and communities and  
 1078 the health inequities that must be mitigated in that process (NRC, 2009).

1079 *Transparency*

1080           There are explicit, auditable procedures for defining risk and applying those definitions.  
 1081 The guidance provided by various reports of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,  
 1082 and Medicine can achieve transparency, including the procedural fairness that it requires (NRC,  
 1083 1996).

1084           The committee notes that it **chose not to consider three issues:**

- 1085
- 1086           • **Political context:** The committee appreciates that decisions about the public’s health  
 1087 are made in the context of existing political realities and those are not static.  
 1088 However, the committee believes that regardless of the political context, officials at  
 1089 all levels will administer these principles faithfully, considering the wellbeing of all  
 1090 members of the communities that they are elected or appointed to serve. The

1091 committee also acknowledges, as stated earlier, that other groups are working to  
1092 inform allocation strategies as well.

- 1093 • **Regulatory and public health changes:** The committee recognizes that there are  
1094 settings where risks could be changed by regulatory or public health requirements  
1095 (e.g., mask mandates, greater spacing of workers in food processing facilities).  
1096 Recommending such changes is beyond the committee’s statement of task. However,  
1097 should they occur, they will affect some individuals’ risks of getting sick or  
1098 transmitting infection if they do. As a result, they will affect the operation of the  
1099 allocation procedure, and require adaptive implementation, which the proposed  
1100 framework is designed to make possible. However, it is crucial that these other  
1101 protective measures not be prematurely abandoned.
- 1102 • **Advances in medical treatment and therapeutic agents:** The committee recognizes  
1103 the vast, creative efforts made to improve medical treatment and develop therapeutic  
1104 agents. As they succeed, they should reduce the risk of disease severity and may  
1105 reduce the risk of transmission of infection. Here, too, the adaptability of the  
1106 allocation procedure can accommodate changes in risk.

### 1107 **Allocation Phases**

1108 Major efforts are being made by the federal government through Operation Warp Speed  
1109 (OWS) to have enough COVID-19 vaccine available for everyone in the United States as soon as  
1110 possible. However, even with this commitment, the length of time to develop enough vaccine is  
1111 unknown, and the committee has been tasked with considering the difficult choices that will need  
1112 to be made for allocating the tightly constrained initial supply of vaccine (e.g., 10–15 million  
1113 courses, enough to vaccinate approximately 3–5 percent of the U.S. population). The supply of  
1114 vaccine, as it increases, will be incrementally phased in so that some persons or groups of  
1115 persons will receive it earlier than others. The committee here uses the term “phases,” suggesting  
1116 successive deployments, rather than the hierarchical, and static term “tiers.” As vaccine supplies  
1117 are phased in, it will be necessary to have in place an equitable framework to determine who will  
1118 receive a vaccine first, second, and so forth. In this committee’s judgment, an equitable—that is,  
1119 just and reasonable—framework for these phases should follow the proposed foundational  
1120 principles.

1121           **It should be noted that the guidance offered through the committee’s allocation**  
 1122 **framework is intended to inform the work of the Advisory Committee on Immunization**  
 1123 **Practices (ACIP) and that of SLTT authorities in their COVID-19 vaccine allocation**  
 1124 **planning.** There are certain communities (such as the U.S. military) that may handle vaccine  
 1125 allocation separate from this proposed framework.. If the federal government were to provide  
 1126 states with an allotment of COVID-19 vaccine, in the interest of speed and workability, federal  
 1127 allocation to states could be conducted based on these jurisdictions’ population size.<sup>22</sup> While  
 1128 there is obviously variation among SLTT communities in disease burden and demography, these  
 1129 differences are not large enough to justify the delay and deliberation that would be required to  
 1130 decide on customized allocations to each location. Speed is essential because many difficult  
 1131 choices need to be made at the state and local levels.

1132           One exception to a straightforward population-based approach would be to withhold a  
 1133 percentage (e.g., 10 percent) of available vaccine supply at the federal level as a reserve for  
 1134 deployment by CDC for use in areas of special need or epidemiological “hot spots.”<sup>23</sup> If by the  
 1135 time COVID-19 vaccines become available, the United States. has achieved the success seen in  
 1136 other countries in stopping widespread community transmission with non-pharmaceutical  
 1137 interventions and test, trace, isolate, quarantine approaches, a more focused outbreak response  
 1138 will be feasible.

1139           Specific to tribal nations, it is important to acknowledge that the federal government  
 1140 would allocate vaccine to tribal, urban Indian, and Indian Health Service (IHS) facilities directly  
 1141 through the existing IHS system. Federal trust responsibility for health care to Native people  
 1142 mandates that. To do so successfully, IHS allocation will require additional funding and external  
 1143 oversight. While separate from state allocation, it may also be in states’ best interest to  
 1144 supplement IHS allocation with a portion of their own supply in order to protect the public’s  
 1145 health. Even in this scenario, states would not oversee how tribal governments allocate vaccine  
 1146 in order to ensure tribal sovereignty.

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<sup>22</sup> There remains uncertainty as to whether private entities, such as healthcare systems or businesses, will be able to access allotments of COVID-19 vaccines outside of a federal-to-state allotment system.

<sup>23</sup> Planning for whether an epidemiological “hot spot” reserve would be valuable and make a difference also depends on the characteristics of the vaccine (e.g., how long it takes for immunity to develop, etc.).

1147 *Operationalizing the Criteria to Determine Allocation Phases*

1148           Data will not be available to characterize each individual in terms of these criteria. Even  
1149 were those data available, an allocation system based on individual priority scores would be  
1150 technically impractical for delivering millions of courses of vaccine to geographically distributed  
1151 individuals. To determine the population groups that comprise each allocation phase, the  
1152 committee operationalized the above criteria by characterizing certain population groups in terms  
1153 of the risks faced by their typical members and the ability of a vaccine to reduce those risks (see  
1154 Table 2). The committee also considered the role mitigating factors such as access to PPE and  
1155 the ability to social distance / isolate or telework when applying the risk-based criteria and  
1156 determining the priority population groups.

1157

1158 **DRAFT TABLE 2** Applying the Allocation Criteria to Specific Population Groups

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Population Group</b>	<b>Criterion 1: Risk of Acquiring Infection</b>	<b>Criterion 2: Risk of Severe Morbidity and Mortality</b>	<b>Criterion 3: Risk of Negative Societal Impact</b>	<b>Criterion 4: Risk of Transmitting Infection to Others</b>	<b>Mitigating Factors for Consideration</b>
1a	High risk workers in health care facilities	H	M	H	H	High risk of acquiring infection due to no choice in setting but may have access to personal protective equipment. Essential to protecting the health care system.
1a	First responders	H	M	H	H	High risk of acquiring infection due to no choice in setting but may have access to personal protective equipment. Essential to protecting the health care system.
1b	People with significant comorbid conditions	M	H	M	L	High risk of severe morbidity and mortality, but may be able to social distance and isolate.
1b	Older adults in congregate or overcrowded settings	H	H	L	L	High risk of acquiring infection due to lack of choice in setting.
2	Critical risk workers (part 1)	H	M	H	M	High risk of acquiring infection due to no choice in setting, but may have access to personal protective equipment.
2	Teachers and school staff	H	M	H	H	High risk of loss to an essential service, but there are alternative choices such as online schooling (lower grades should be given priority).
2	People with moderate comorbid conditions	M	M	M	L	Moderate risk of severe morbidity and mortality, but may be able to social distance and isolate.
2	All older adults	M	H	L	L	High risk of severe morbidity and mortality, but may be able to social distance and isolate.

2	People in homeless shelters or group homes	H	H	L	H	High risk of acquiring infection due to lack of choice in setting.
2	Incarcerated/detained people and staff	H	M	L	M	High risk of acquiring infection due to lack of choice in setting.
3	Young adults	H	L	M	H	Low risk of severe morbidity and mortality, high risk of transmission, but may be able to social distance/isolate/close bars, etc.
3	Children	M	L	M	H	Low risk of severe morbidity and mortality
3	Critical risk workers (part 2)	M	L	M	L	Moderate risk of acquiring infection due to lack of choice in setting.

1159 NOTES: Cell entries are for a typical member of each group. H = high risk, M = medium risk, L = low risk. M can indicate either a heterogeneous  
1160 group or one whose typical member bear medium risk. All cell entries are relative to risks in the overall population, not measures of absolute risk,  
1161 and are based on the committee's expert judgment of the evidence and the uncertainties at the time of this writing. Lastly, the committee has  
1162 elected not to use the designation "essential worker." Instead, the committee refers to these workers as critical risk workers as they are both  
1163 working in industries vital to the functioning of society and in occupations where they cannot avoid exposure risk by, for example, teleworking.  
1164 This is described further later in this chapter.

1165           The framework recognizes current uncertainty regarding the disease, its spread, and  
1166 treatments and the possibility that new evidence may change the risks and, with them, the  
1167 priorities. Achieving all of these goals requires evidence, regarding the disease, the program,  
1168 treatments, and their impacts. That evidence is required by both those managing the COVID-19  
1169 vaccination program and those who depend on it. The COVID-19 vaccination program must  
1170 immediately begin developing and implementing procedures that continuously collect data.

#### 1171 *Discussion of the Allocation Phases*

1172           The committee recommends a four-phased approach to COVID-19 vaccine allocation.  
1173 Within the population groups included in each of these four phases, the committee recommends  
1174 that vaccine access should be prioritized for geographic areas identified as vulnerable through  
1175 CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index. This issue is discussed further in the ensuring equity section  
1176 later in this chapter.

1177           Included in the first phase would be “frontline” health workers—health professionals  
1178 who are involved in direct patient care, as well as those in transport, environmental services staff,  
1179 or other health care facility services, who risk exposure to bodily fluids or aerosols. Under  
1180 conditions of such scarcity, access should not be defined by professional title, but rather by the  
1181 individual’s actual risk of exposure to COVID-19. The rationale for including “frontline” health  
1182 workers in the first phase is manifold: their contact with patients exhibiting COVID-related  
1183 symptoms puts them at obvious risk of exposure (despite the use of PPE, which is also often  
1184 inadequate in supply); the fact that they work in an essential industry, but may be precluded from  
1185 performing their professional duties if not adequately protected; and the reality that many are  
1186 potentially important nodes in onward transmission networks given that many live in  
1187 multigenerational homes and belong to communities whose opportunities for well-being have  
1188 been forestalled by systemic racism and discrimination. The latter is especially true for many of  
1189 those who work in nursing homes and as home health aides. In addition to frontline health care  
1190 workers, first responders are included as well.

1191           Another group to include in the first phase would be those older adults living in  
1192 congregate settings—such as nursing homes or skilled nursing facilities—and other similar  
1193 settings. Last, individuals with select high-risk comorbid and underlying conditions are included  
1194 in Phase 1.

1195           In Phase 2, expansion of vaccine supply would allow for the immunization of another  
1196 cohort of individuals with comorbid and underlying conditions that put them at increased risk, as  
1197 well as all older adults not already included in Phase 1. Health care providers and public health  
1198 authorities will need to assess the risk of increased age (while morbidity and mortality begins to  
1199 rise substantially with age starting around age 50, it is most prevalent above age 70), as well as  
1200 the presence of comorbid conditions. Current knowledge of the relative risks stemming from  
1201 specific underlying risk factors is evolving quickly and will be better known by the time vaccines  
1202 actually become available. This may allow decision makers to target those at greatest risk of  
1203 serious morbidity and mortality more effectively than is possible today. This could also allow the  
1204 identification of younger people who are at high risk of infection or serious morbidity/mortality  
1205 so that they can also be prioritized. The development of life-saving therapeutics may also alter  
1206 the prioritization if early detection and treatment provide a means for averting much of the  
1207 serious morbidity and mortality seen with COVID-19 today.

1208           Recognizing the importance of education and child development, teachers and school  
1209 staff are included in Phase 2. It is important to include this group relatively early to facilitate the  
1210 reopening of schools, and to protect the most high-risk adults present when this occurs given  
1211 current knowledge about morbidity and mortality due to COVID-19.

1212           People who are incarcerated or detained and people who live in group homes and  
1213 homeless shelters—congregate settings—are also included in Phase 2 along with the staff who  
1214 work in such settings. With respect to these groups, the committee stressed the importance of  
1215 recognizing their reduced autonomy and the recognized difficulty of preventing spread in such  
1216 settings should COVID-19 be introduced. Last, the first cohort of workers who are both in  
1217 industries essential to the functioning of society and at high risk of exposure are included in  
1218 Phase 2.


1219           In Phase 3, vaccine supply will become more widely available and allow the broader  
1220 immunization of workers essential to restoring full economic activity. In this phase many  
1221 workers will still be able to safely work from home and thus would be prioritized for later access  
1222 to the vaccine. In this phase the broad immunization of children and young adults is included,  
1223 given emerging evidence of the role they may play in asymptomatic transmission, especially in  
1224 intrafamilial situations. An important caveat here is that broad immunization of children will



1225 depend on whether new COVID-19 vaccines have been adequately tested for safety and efficacy  
1226 in childhood age groups. Most initial trials are testing vaccines among older age groups who are  
1227 known to suffer more serious morbidity and mortality.

1228         Finally, once vaccine supply becomes more broadly available (Phase 4), vaccines would  
1229 be made available to healthy adult individuals who would be interested in receiving the vaccine  
1230 for personal protection. Ideally, these individuals would be willing to participate in an egalitarian  
1231 process (such as a lottery) if there are persistent local or regional shortages in this phase. It is  
1232 important to acknowledge that uncertainties about the COVID-19 vaccine and the nature of the  
1233 pandemic itself persist, but the committee approached its framework under the best available  
1234 evidence today. Under the context described, the committee’s allocation approach is shown in  
1235 Figure 2 and described in greater detail below—first as a description of the various phases,  
1236 following by discussion of ensuring equity across all phases.

1237         The proposed approach assumes a poorly-controlled outbreak in which the relative  
1238 distribution of burden of morbidity and mortality is similar to what exists today. Given the  
1239 epidemiology of COVID-19 so far, it is reasonable to assume these underlying conditions will  
1240 hold around the anticipated start of the U.S. COVID-19 vaccination program. However, it is  
1241 possible that the United States is able to substantially control the outbreak similar to situations in  
1242 countries such as New Zealand. In that case, a prioritization approach that initially emphasizes  
1243 transmission over direct protection from morbidity and mortality could be considered.



1244

1245 **DRAFT FIGURE 2** A phased approach to vaccine allocation for COVID-19

1246 **A Phased Approach to Vaccine Allocation**

1247 **Phase 1**

1248 Phase 1 includes the following groups:

- 1249
- 1250 • High-risk workers in health care facilities;
  - 1251 • First responders;
  - 1252 • People of all ages with comorbid and underlying conditions that put them at
  - 1253 *significantly* higher risk; and
  - 1254 • Older adults living in congregate or overcrowded settings.

1255

1256 According to estimates provided by OWS (Slaoui, 2020), there should be sufficient

1257 courses available relatively soon after commencement of vaccine production to cover an

1258 estimated 10–15 million people. In that limited supply scenario, high-risk and high-exposure

1259 workers in health care facilities and first responders should constitute an initial “Jumpstart”

1260 Phase 1a. This would be followed by Phase 1b comprised of people with comorbid and

1261 underlying conditions that put them at *significantly* higher risk and older adults living in

1262 congregate or overcrowded settings.

1263 Phase 1a would cover approximately 5 percent of the U.S. population, and in its entirety,

1264 Phase 1 would cover an estimated 15 percent. Such a structure could help kick off initial vaccine

1265 administration, while SLTT authorities prepare distribution procedures for the next phases.

1266 **Phase 1a**

1267 *Population: High-Risk Workers in Health care Facilities*

1268 This group includes front line health care workers (in hospitals, nursing homes, or

1269 providing home care) who either: (1) work in situations where risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission

1270 is high, or (2) are at an elevated risk of transmitting the infection to patients at high risk of

1271 mortality and severe morbidity. These individuals—who are themselves unable to avoid

1272 exposure to the virus—play a critical role in ensuring that the health system can care for COVID-

1273 19 patients.

1274           These groups include not only clinicians (e.g., nurses, physicians, respiratory technicians,  
1275 dentists and hygienists) but also other workers in health care settings who meet the Phase 1a risk  
1276 criteria (e.g., nursing assistants, environmental services staff, assisted living home staff, long-  
1277 term care facility staff, group home staff, and home caregivers). Situations with high risk of  
1278 transmission include caring for COVID-19 patients, cleaning areas where COVID-19 patients are  
1279 admitted and treated, and performing procedures with high risk of aerosolization such as  
1280 endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, suctioning, turning the patient to the prone position,  
1281 disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, invasive dental procedures and exams, invasive  
1282 specimen collection, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The committee also includes morticians  
1283 and funeral home workers involved in handling bodies as part of this high-risk group.

1284 *Rationale*

1285           Front line health care workers are particularly important in stemming the pandemic and  
1286 preventing death and severe illness. From the beginning of the pandemic, many frontline workers  
1287 have worked in environments where they have been exposed to the virus, often without adequate  
1288 PPE. These individuals are critical to providing essential care, especially to older adults who are  
1289 at greatest risk of COVID-19 disease or death. Vaccinating these individuals not only enables  
1290 them to provide these services, but also reduces the risk that they will spread the infection as they  
1291 work in hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, home care, and group homes, or  
1292 return to their own homes.

1293           Frontline health care workers are at significantly higher risk of becoming infected with  
1294 SARS-CoV-2 compared to members of the general public. A recently cohort study using data  
1295 from the United States and the United Kingdom found that frontline health care workers had  
1296 nearly 12 times the risk of the general population of testing positive for COVID-19 (Nguyen et  
1297 al., 2020). Protecting these workers will have a great impact on protecting older individuals, who  
1298 receive a large share of health services and have borne a large share of the disease burden from  
1299 COVID-19.

1300           Nearly 80 percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the United States have occurred in people  
1301 over the age of 65 (CDC, 2020e). Nursing home residents and staff have been at the center of the  
1302 pandemic since the first reported cases. As of August 2, 2020, there were 286,382 confirmed or  
1303 suspected COVID-19 cases and 45,958 deaths among nursing home residents, according to the

1304 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (CMS, 2020a), and these numbers are likely  
1305 to be underreported (Ouslander and Grabowski, 2020). Nursing home workers are at increased  
1306 risk themselves—CMS also reports that nearly 800 nursing home staff in the United States have  
1307 died from COVID-19—and play a role in infection spread within and between institutions (CMS,  
1308 2020b). Asymptomatic spread by nursing home workers is a well-established route (Lee et al.,  
1309 2020), and vaccinating this group could have a significant impact on the incidence of infection in  
1310 this setting. Nursing home and home care employment is low-paying, with many workers  
1311 holding jobs at more than one nursing home or home care setting. Many of these workers take  
1312 public transportation and live in multi-generational housing, increasing the likelihood of  
1313 exposure and exposing others.

1314 In addition to their occupational and community exposures, these workers are statistically  
1315 at higher risk of COVID-19 disease and severe health effects because they come from  
1316 populations with higher rates of comorbid conditions. A relatively high proportion of nursing  
1317 home workers are Black (27.8 percent) as are home care workers likely to be Black (29.7  
1318 percent) or Latinx (17.5 percent) (McCormack et al., 2020). A sizable proportion of such  
1319 workers are over 65 as well (Black: 9.1 percent Latinx: 11.3 percent). In the first months of the  
1320 pandemic, some hospitals were unprepared for the large number of COVID-19 cases. Exposure  
1321 of hospital workers was often poorly controlled, and many workers received inadequate PPE.  
1322 Tens of thousands of hospital workers have been infected, and many hundreds have died,  
1323 although there are no accurate data on these cases. While there is still a severe national PPE  
1324 shortage, it appears that many hospitals are now better able to protect members of their  
1325 workforce who directly work with COVID-19 patients. However, this is not true uniformly  
1326 across the country, and, even better equipped hospitals still leave some workers exposed.  
1327 Nursing homes have struggled with having adequate PPE since the beginning of the pandemic  
1328 and some continue to do so (Clark, 2020). Individuals who provide home care or work in  
1329 hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted and living (or similar) facilities—who are also at high risk  
1330 for severe illness and death because of comorbid conditions and age—should be among the first  
1331 receiving the vaccine.

1332 Vaccination is not a substitute for non-medical or (non-therapeutic) preventive policies  
1333 and equipment. All exposed workers should be, for example, provided an adequate supply of  
1334 appropriate PPE. It is vitally important that the prospect of vaccination not supplant efforts to

1335 assure adequate supply of protective equipment or continuing the use mitigation strategies after  
1336 vaccination.

### 1337 *Estimated Group Size*<sup>24</sup>

1338 According to the best currently available estimates for the United States, among health  
1339 care practitioners and technical staff, 6,728,000 are exposed to COVID-19 more than once per  
1340 week; among health care support staff, 3,160,000 are exposed to COVID-19 more than once per  
1341 week. There are also approximately 1,500,000 full-time nursing home employees, 432,000 health  
1342 care practitioners who work in skilled nursing facilities, and 3,162,000 home health care workers  
1343 (Baker et al., 2020; BLS, 2019b). The number of morticians, undertakers, and funeral directors in  
1344 the United States is estimated to be approximately 25,000 people (Statista, 2020).

### 1345 *Population: First Responders*

1346 This group includes emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, police, and  
1347 firefighters (including volunteer firefighters). Like health care workers, many first responders  
1348 have been working in situations in which exposure to infected individuals is sometimes  
1349 unavoidable. Given their public serving role, first responders who become ill can transmit  
1350 infection to their families and to the broader community. While data on exposure risk for first  
1351 responders are limited, initial estimates indicate high infection rates among first responders in  
1352 high COVID-19 transmission settings. For example, in early April, approximately 20 percent of  
1353 New York Police Department (NYPD) officers were out sick (DeStefano, 2020) and, as of May,  
1354 43 NYPD officers had died of COVID-19 (Eyewitness News, 2020).

### 1355 *Rationale*

1356 First responders are central to society's overall functioning, to its response to the virus,  
1357 and to ensuring that others with medical emergencies receive necessary immediate care. When  
1358 emergency medical personnel and fire fighters are unable to work, because of illness or when  
1359 isolating because of exposure to the virus, their ability to provide badly needed, medical, rescue  
1360 and fire-fighting services, is impaired. First responders who are at high risk of exposure who are

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<sup>24</sup> Estimated group sizes across phases are not intended to be entirely cumulative, and the committee acknowledges there is overlap between the group estimates provided. Please see the discussion of limitations at the end of this chapter for additional discussion of data.

1361 also at high risk for severe illness and death because of comorbid conditions and age should be  
 1362 among the first in this group receiving the vaccine.

1363 Many of the reasons for protecting health care workers also apply to first responders.  
 1364 These include the social value of maintaining emergency services, reciprocity for assumption of  
 1365 additional risk by these groups, and—in some cases—high risk of acquisition and, potentially,  
 1366 transmission. Similarly, until substantial and sustained suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak is  
 1367 achieved, first responders are likely to need PPE for performing their responsibilities.

### 1368 *Estimated Group Size*

1369 An estimated 2.1 million first responders are covered by this population group  
 1370 comprising 262,000 EMS personnel, 701,000 police, and 1,100,000 firefighters (approximately  
 1371 300,000 of whom are paid with the rest serving in a volunteer capacity, and a subset of whom  
 1372 provide emergency medical services) (BLS, 2019; BLS, 2020a; Evarts, 2020).

### 1373 **Phase 1b**

#### 1374 *Population: People of All Ages with Comorbid and Underlying Conditions That Put Them at* 1375 *Significantly Higher Risk*

1376 It remains unclear precisely which comorbid and underlying conditions put individuals at  
 1377 a significantly higher risk of severe COVID-19 disease or death. CDC continues to gather  
 1378 evidence on this topic, and lists the following as factors associated with an increased risk of  
 1379 severe COVID-19 disease: Cancer, chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary  
 1380 disease (COPD), immunocompromised state from solid organ transplant, obesity (body mass  
 1381 index [BMI]  $\geq 30$ ), serious heart conditions (e.g., heart failure, coronary artery disease,  
 1382 cardiomyopathies), sickle cell disease, and type 2 diabetes mellitus (CDC, 2020d). Vaccinating  
 1383 all individuals with the above comorbid conditions in Phase 1b would prove unmanageable, as  
 1384 the group includes hundreds of millions of people in the United States. In a highly constrained  
 1385 vaccine scenario, the initial group of recipients with comorbid and underlying conditions could  
 1386 focus specifically on individuals with *two or more* of these designated conditions.

1387 It should be noted that as the relationship between severe COVID-19 disease and certain  
 1388 comorbid conditions becomes clearer, this list is subject to evolve. ACIP and CDC will play a  
 1389 key role in assessing relevant evidence on this topic, and in the process of prioritization, it will

1390 be critical to recognize that not all comorbid conditions are equal when it comes to their  
1391 placement in an allocation framework.

### 1392 *Rationale*

1393 According to data recently published through the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)  
1394 Associated Hospitalization Surveillance Network (COVID-NET) from March 1 through August  
1395 15, 2020, approximately 75 percent of adults hospitalized for COVID-19 in the United States had  
1396 at least two comorbid conditions. More than 60 percent of hospitalized adults had three or more  
1397 underlying conditions (McClung, 2020).<sup>25</sup>

1398 Multiple studies have explored a range of comorbid and underlying conditions as  
1399 potential risk factors for severe COVID-19 disease. According to CDC’s surveillance data for  
1400 March 2020, people with COVID-19 who had underlying health conditions—most commonly  
1401 hypertension, obesity, cardiovascular disease, diabetes mellitus, and chronic lung disease—were  
1402 6 times as likely to be hospitalized and 12 times as likely to die from the disease as those without  
1403 underlying health conditions. A study from a large health care system in New York found that  
1404 individuals below age 60 with a BMI of 30 or higher were more likely to be admitted to acute  
1405 and critical care than patients in the same age categories with a BMI below 30 (Lighter et al.,  
1406 2020). Another recent study suggests that, in particular, those with chronic heart failure, kidney  
1407 disease, and a BMI of 40 or higher are particularly high-risk groups (Petrilli et al., 2020).  
1408 Ultimately, given the high risk of adverse outcomes in individuals with select comorbid  
1409 conditions and the evolving evidence on this topic, it will be critical to monitor how the nature  
1410 and number of comorbid conditions affect morbidity and mortality at the individual level.

### 1411 *Estimated Group Size*

1412 There is currently no clear data to accurately estimate the size of this population group  
1413 with multiple select comorbid conditions, which the committee acknowledges as a key  
1414 limitation. A recent modeling study by Clark et al. (2020) may help to provide some insight on a  
1415 general range for this population group. In the study, the authors highlighted a “high risk” group

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<sup>25</sup> The list of comorbid conditions assessed in COVID-NET differs slightly from CDC’s current list of conditions that put individuals at “increased risk” of severe illness from COVID-19 disease. The COVID-NET list includes hypertension, obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, neurologic disease, chronic lung disease, renal disease, asthma, immune suppression, gastrointestinal/liver disease, and autoimmune disease.



1416 defined as individuals who would require hospitalization if infected with COVID-19, calculated  
1417 using age-specific infection-hospitalization ratios for COVID-19. The study estimated that 19–20  
1418 million people in the United States fall into this category. Given that approximately 75 percent of  
1419 those hospitalized for COVID-19 based on the COVID-NET data had multiple comorbid  
1420 conditions, the committee estimates that the value of 19–20 million may approximate the number  
1421 of individuals with multiple comorbid conditions (from the CDC list above).

1422 *Population: Older Adults Living in Congregate or Overcrowded Settings*

1423 This group includes older individuals living in situations that increase their risk of SARS-  
1424 CoV-2 infection and resultant morbidity and mortality. The scientific community’s  
1425 understanding of age-specific COVID-19 mortality is still emerging, and there are concerns,  
1426 based on the lower efficacy of other vaccines (such as influenza vaccine) among the elderly, that  
1427 COVID-19 vaccines will have a lower efficacy among older adults. For these reasons, the  
1428 committee recommends that ACIP determine age guidelines as health and vaccine efficacy data  
1429 become more available.

1430 *Rationale*

1431 According to CDC, the case fatality proportion for COVID-19 is substantially higher  
1432 among older adults in the United States. As a result, as of August 1, 2020, approximately 80  
1433 percent of all deaths occurred in adults 65 and older (Freed, 2020). Similarly, the risk of  
1434 hospitalization from COVID-19 increases with age, with rates per 100,000 significantly higher  
1435 for adults 65 and older (~199 per 100,000 for 65–74 year old individuals, ~329 per 100,000 for  
1436 75–84 individuals, and ~513 per 100,000 for individuals 85 and older) (CDC, 2020b). A  
1437 significant proportion of COVID-19 deaths occurred in individuals living in long-term care  
1438 facilities (CMS, 2020a). Data from Canada and other countries, as well as investigative  
1439 reporting in the United States, suggests that the percentage of COVID-19 deaths in long-term  
1440 care facilities may be higher than indicated by CDC’s database (CIHI, 2020; NYT, 2020a).  
1441 Whatever the precise numbers, it is clear that directly protecting older adults—particularly those  
1442 living in congregate or overcrowded settings—will have substantial impact on COVID-19-  
1443 related severe outcomes. Although there is some uncertainty regarding how well the vaccine will  
1444 work in older individuals, models find that prioritizing older adults will have a substantial impact

1445 on mortality, even if the vaccine is up to 50 percent less effective among people 60 or older  
 1446 compared people younger than 60 (Lipsitch, 2020). In addition, adjuvanted vaccines such as the  
 1447 recombinant zoster vaccine (RZV; Shingrix) have been demonstrated to provide efficacy to older  
 1448 adults across the age spectrum (Bastidas et al., 2019; Dagneu et al., 2020).

1449 The committee also suspects that many older adults living in overcrowded settings may  
 1450 live in multigenerational households. Historically, in virtually every society, people lived  
 1451 together in households comprised of three and even four generations (Miller and Nebeker-  
 1452 Adams, 2017). Although such households are less common overall in the United States today,  
 1453 they are still often found in lower income communities. Such households typically have  
 1454 relatively few bedrooms and bathrooms, with crowded sleeping arrangements and reduced  
 1455 opportunity to practice social distancing. Because many individuals living in multigenerational  
 1456 households in the United States also work in jobs that put them at elevated risk of exposure to  
 1457 COVID-19, it is important to vaccinate the members of those households who are most  
 1458 vulnerable to protect them from acquiring COVID-19 infection.

1459 The combination of risk of severe disease due to advanced age and high risk of COVID-  
 1460 19 acquisition and transmission among older adults included in this population group make it  
 1461 among the highest priority groups for receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.

#### 1462 *Estimated Group Size*

1463 There are approximately 1,347,000 nursing home residents in the United States and  
 1464 811,000 individuals living in residential care facilities. In addition, 4,700,000 adults over the age  
 1465 of 65 live below the poverty line, meaning the individuals included in this group total more than  
 1466 6.8 million people (CDC, 2020a,f; Cubanski, 2018).

#### 1467 **Phase 2**

1468 Phase 2 includes the following groups:

- 1469
- 1470 • Critical risk workers—workers who are both in industries essential to the functioning
  - 1471 of society and at substantially high risk of exposure;
  - 1472 • Teachers and school staff;

- 1473 • People of all ages with comorbid and underlying conditions that put them at  
1474 *moderately* higher risk;
- 1475 • All older adults not included in Phase 1
- 1476 • People in homeless shelters or group homes for individuals with physical or mental  
1477 disabilities or in recovery; and
- 1478 • People in prisons, jails, detention centers, and similar facilities, and staff who work in  
1479 such settings.

1480  
1481 Phase 2 would cover an estimated 30–35 percent of the U.S. population; combined with  
1482 Phase 1, the groups included across both phases would total approximately 45–50 percent of the  
1483 population.

1484 *Population: Critical Risk Workers—Workers in Both Industries Essential to the Functioning of*  
1485 *Society and at Substantially High Risk of Exposure*

1486 Another group included in Phase 2 are people whose work is vital to the functioning of  
1487 society and the economy, and whose work causes them to have a high level of exposure to  
1488 persons with SARS-CoV-2 infection. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has  
1489 identified categories of “Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers” whose functioning “is  
1490 imperative during the response to the COVID-19 emergency for both public health and safety as  
1491 well as community well-being” (Krebs, 2020). The list of categories of workers designated by  
1492 DHS includes many groups of workers who are at high risk of exposure. Others designated by  
1493 DHS, however, are either able to telework or are otherwise isolated and not at high risk of  
1494 exposure. Recent work has found that 37 percent of jobs in the U.S. economy are  
1495 “teleworkable.” Many of these jobs are in occupations in essential industries, but they also  
1496 represent “white collar” positions in industries that are generally considered “blue collar”  
1497 (Dingel and Neiman, 2020). Thus, while performing “essential work,” they are able to avoid the  
1498 exposure risk while doing vital work. For this reason, the committee has elected not to use the  
1499 designation “essential worker” in the allocation framework. Instead, the committee refers to these  
1500 workers as critical risk workers as they are both working in industries vital to the functioning of  
1501 society and in occupations where they cannot avoid exposure risk.

1502 The industries in which these critical risk workers are employed are essential to keep  
1503 society and the economy functioning. Since the beginning of the pandemic, millions of people

1504 have been going to work and risking exposure to the virus to ensure there is food in markets;  
1505 pharmaceutical products in drug stores; public safety and order maintained; mail and packages  
1506 delivered; and buses, trains, and planes operated. This group also includes other health care  
1507 workers who are not already accounted for in Phase 1a. Importantly, only those occupations in  
1508 these essential industries where there is *unavoidable* high risk of exposure qualify as the critical  
1509 risk workers in this group.

1510 *Rationale*

1511 Large numbers of these workers whose work is vital to the function of society and the  
1512 economy have been infected with COVID-19 while on the job, although precise counts are not  
1513 available (The Lancet, 2020). It is the committee's belief that those members of these sectors  
1514 who are at higher risk for exposure and infection should be given priority. Many of them work  
1515 without adequate protection while in close proximity with coworkers and members of the public.  
1516 Groups of workers in essential industries and who are at high risk of exposure (CDC, 2020g)  
1517 include workers in the U.S. food supply system who plant, harvest and package crops; slaughter  
1518 and process meat; deliver food to stores and stock shelves and staff checkout lines. In many food  
1519 system workplaces, inadequate protections have been provided. There are many reasons that  
1520 food supply workers are at increased risk of infection and disease, including prolonged close  
1521 workplace contact with coworkers, frequent community contact with fellow workers, mobility of  
1522 the work force (i.e., migrant workers), shared transportation to and from the workplace, lack of  
1523 paid sick leave, congregate housing (including living in employer-furnished housing and shared  
1524 living quarters, and living in crowded and multigenerational homes) (Oliver, 2020). These low-  
1525 paid workers may be less likely to attempt to use the health care system for care for economic or  
1526 legal reasons. Workers in other sectors are at increased risk as well, including workers employed  
1527 in public transportation, (such as buses, trains, car services or planes), especially in localities or  
1528 situations where passengers are not required to wear masks. Also, in this population group are  
1529 postal workers and workers in warehouses and fulfillment centers. Not all workers in these  
1530 essential industries are U.S. citizens or green card holders; some may have come to the United  
1531 States as refugees or may be undocumented. All workers in this population group need to be  
1532 provided the vaccine, and special efforts must be made to reach these workers in ways that  
1533 encourage them to be vaccinated.

1534 Echoing what was stated in Phase 1, it is important to note that while community  
1535 transmission of SARS-CoV-2 continues, vaccination is not a substitute for providing other  
1536 interventions to mitigate exposure risk, such as engineering and administrative controls and  
1537 providing adequate personal protective equipment (OSHA, 2020).

#### 1538 *Estimated Group Size*

1539 Workers from numerous essential industries are included in this group, such as workers  
1540 in food and beverage production (1,700,000), cashiers/food store workers (865,000), pharmacists  
1541 and pharmacy staff (621,000), and public transit workers (179,000). There are more than 15  
1542 million health care workers in the United States, though a large percentage of them are already  
1543 covered in Phase 1a above (BLS, 2019c, 2020b,c; USDA, 2020). Ideally, workers included in  
1544 this group would cover the initial 20 percent of those from industries deemed to be essential.

#### 1545 *Population: Teachers and School Staff*

1546 This group includes school staff, including teachers, child-care workers, administrators,  
1547 environmental services staff, and maintenance workers, and school bus drivers.

#### 1548 *Rationale*

1549 Across the nation, states and localities are placing a high priority on re-opening schools  
1550 and expanding childcare programs to promote children's educational and social development and  
1551 facilitate parents' employment. Exposure is very difficult to control in these institutions,  
1552 especially those providing care or education to young children. All workers in these facilities are  
1553 among those who need to be protected from the virus during Phase 2. Due to the nature of their  
1554 work, teachers and school staff who return to work in schools are at higher risk of COVID-19  
1555 infection and serve an important societal role in ensuring that students' educational needs are  
1556 met. One could also argue that vaccinating teachers and school staff could help to reduce viral  
1557 transmission, with these teachers and staff serving as connections between schools and broader  
1558 society.

1559 Furthermore, the importance of re-opening schools, especially for elementary-aged  
1560 children, cannot be understated. Reestablishing a sense of normalcy for students and their  
1561 families through in-person education will help to achieve long-term health benefits for children  
1562 and facilitate important social development for them as well.

1563 As some states and localities choose to begin reopening schools, it is also important to  
 1564 consider the direct impact of COVID-19 disease on teachers and staff. A recent study found that  
 1565 39.8 percent of teachers had “definite” and 50.6 percent had “definite or possible” risk factors for  
 1566 severe COVID-19 disease (with similar results for other school staff), emphasizing the vaccine’s  
 1567 potential importance in protecting teachers and promoting in-person education safely (Gaffney et  
 1568 al., 2020). Therefore, it is likely that teachers at highest risk would be vaccinated in Phase 1b.

#### 1569 *Estimated Group Size*

1570 Across the United States, there are 8,605,000 teachers and staff at elementary and  
 1571 secondary schools; there are also approximately 463,000 people who provide child care services  
 1572 (BLS, 2019).

#### 1573 *Population: People of All Ages with Comorbid and Underlying Conditions That Put Them at* 1574 *Moderately Higher Risk*

1575 Drawing on CDC’s list of comorbid conditions discussed in Phase 1b, this population  
 1576 group would include anyone with *one* of the previously mentioned conditions (Phase 1b includes  
 1577 individuals with multiple comorbid conditions from among those listed).

1578 Other comorbid conditions may be considered for this phase as evidence emerges. In  
 1579 addition to CDC’s list of comorbid conditions that put individuals at increased risk, CDC has  
 1580 also compiled a list of comorbid conditions that *might* put individuals at increased risk. This list  
 1581 includes asthma (moderate-to-severe); cerebrovascular disease; cystic fibrosis; hypertension;  
 1582 immunocompromised state from blood or bone marrow transplant, immune deficiencies,  
 1583 HIV/AIDS, use of corticosteroids, or use of other immunosuppressive medicines; neurologic  
 1584 conditions; liver disease; pregnancy; pulmonary fibrosis; smoking; thalassemia; and type 1  
 1585 diabetes mellitus (CDC, 2020c).

#### 1586 *Rationale*

1587 Similar to the discussion in Phase 1b, the rationale for prioritizing persons with such  
 1588 conditions is that the vaccine may have a greater impact among those with increased likelihood  
 1589 of severe illness (hospitalizations, intensive care unit admissions, and deaths) than in persons  
 1590 without these conditions, resulting in a decreased burden on the health care system and more  
 1591 lives being saved from all conditions. Based on the aforementioned COVID-NET data,

1592 approximately 12 percent of adults hospitalized for COVID-19 in the United States. between  
1593 March 1 and August 15, 2020 had one select comorbid or underlying condition.<sup>26</sup>

1594 *Estimated Group Size*

1595 Without accounting for those with multiple comorbid conditions in Phase 1b, the  
1596 committee is not currently in a position to accurately estimate the number of individuals in this  
1597 population group. Furthermore, it remains possible that additional comorbid conditions are  
1598 included in this category as evidence emerges, but this population group would likely include  
1599 tens of millions of people.

1600 *Population: All Other Older Adults*

1601 Beyond the older adult group already discussed in Phase 1b (those older adults living in  
1602 congregate or overcrowded settings), this group includes all older adults residing in the United  
1603 States. As discussed earlier, the committee defers to ACIP to determine specific age guidelines  
1604 as health and vaccine efficacy data become more available.

1605 *Rationale*

1606 As discussed in the rationale for a subset of older adults in Phase 1b, the case fatality  
1607 proportion for COVID-19 is substantially higher among older adults in the United States, and the  
1608 rate of hospitalization for COVID-19 increases with age. Ultimately, one could argue that age is  
1609 itself an underlying condition for COVID-19 given the high risk of severe disease and death due  
1610 to COVID-19 among older adults.

1611 *Estimated Group Size*

1612 There are estimated to be more than 49.2 million older adults (people 65 and older) living  
1613 in the United States (Survey, 2018). Accounting for some overlap with the groups above, it is  
1614 estimated that there are 13.2 million older adults in the United States without comorbid or  
1615 underlying conditions.

---

<sup>26</sup> The list of comorbid conditions assessed in COVID-NET differs slightly from CDC's current list of conditions that put individuals at "increased risk" of severe illness from COVID-19 disease. The COVID-NET list includes hypertension, obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, neurologic disease, chronic lung disease, renal disease, asthma, immune suppression, gastrointestinal/liver disease, and autoimmune disease.

1616 *Population: People in Homeless Shelters or Group Homes*

1617 This group includes people who live in homeless shelters or group homes for individuals  
1618 with physical or mental disabilities or in recovery, as well as staff of these facilities.

1619 *Rationale*

1620 Many of these people are at risk because of their underlying diseases and because of their  
1621 living setting (Landes et al., 2020). Individuals living in congregate settings face increased risk  
1622 of exposure to COVID-19 if they have limited or shared bathroom facilities and limited ability to  
1623 practice social distancing. In addition, staff at these facilities are at increased risk of exposure  
1624 and are more likely to transmit COVID-19 if infected.

1625 Among people who experience homelessness, many are at high risk of acquiring and  
1626 transmitting infection given their frequent time spent in public places or in congregate settings  
1627 such as shelters. In addition, many people who experience homelessness may suffer from one or  
1628 more underlying health conditions that may put them at higher risk. Among group home  
1629 residents, they may also have comorbid conditions that increase their risk of severe COVID-19  
1630 outcomes, and their autonomy is reduced by living in a group home setting, putting them at risk  
1631 of COVID-19 acquisition and transmission.

1632 *Estimated Group Size*

1633 469,000 people live in group homes, and 575,000 people experience homelessness across  
1634 the United States (Culhane, 2020; Williams, 2013).

1635 *Population: People in Prisons, Jails, Detention Centers, and Similar Facilities, and Staff Who*  
1636 *Work in Such Settings*

1637 Another group to be included in Phase 2 are staff members and persons in prisons, jails,  
1638 and detention centers, including immigration detention facilities. A prisoner is defined as anyone  
1639 who is deprived of personal liberty against his or her will following conviction of a crime.

1640 Although not afforded all the rights of a free person, a prisoner is assured certain rights by the  
1641 U.S. Constitution and the moral standards of the community. Detainees are individuals who are  
1642 kept in jail or some other holding facility even though they have not been convicted of a crime.  
1643 A majority of detainees in jails are individuals who cannot obtain sufficient funds to post bail  
1644 and are not released from jail pending a trial on the criminal charges.



1645 *Rationale*

1646 Data show that persons in state and federal prisons are at a 5.5-fold greater risk of  
 1647 COVID-19 compared to the general U.S. population (Saloner et al., 2020). These people, as well  
 1648 as those in jails, have reduced autonomy and cannot physically distance from others in their  
 1649 congregate living setting and thus need additional protection (Page et al., 2020). As such, their  
 1650 risk of both acquiring and transmitting COVID-19 infection to others is high.

1651 Others may be in detention centers after entering the country without documentation and  
 1652 are now awaiting resolution of their asylum or other claims in immigration detention facilities.  
 1653 Vaccination for this population in Phase 2 is important because other controls, such as  
 1654 maintaining 6-foot distancing, are difficult or impossible to achieve. Most of these people are  
 1655 housed in one of the more than 250 public and private facilities under contract with the federal  
 1656 government, but with varying levels of care as they are not always subject to federal standards.  
 1657 Outbreaks of seasonal influenza demonstrate the porous nature of the medical system in these  
 1658 facilities (Page et al., 2020). Furthermore, as has been described in literature on seasonal  
 1659 influenza vaccine, vaccinating individuals held in immigration detention facilities can help to  
 1660 prevent outbreaks of infectious disease both within these facilities and between facilities and the  
 1661 rest of society (Omer, 2019; Sunderji et al., 2020). This is an especially important consideration  
 1662 for staff in these facilities, as they serve as the conduit between the two.

1663 *Estimated Group Size*

1664 There are currently an estimated 2.3 million incarcerated or detained individuals in the  
 1665 United States, in addition to 423,000 correctional officers, jailers, and support staff, totaling  
 1666 more than 2.7 million people in this group (BLS, 2019).

1667 **Phase 3**

1668 Phase 3 includes the following groups:

- 1669
- 1670 • Young adults;
  - 1671 • Children; and
  - 1672 • Workers in industries essential to the functioning of society and at increased risk of  
 1673 exposure not included in Phases 1 or 2.

1674

1675 Phase 3 would cover approximately 40–45 percent of the U.S. population. Cumulatively,  
1676 Phases 1–3 would then cover 85–95 percent of the U.S. population.

1677 *Population: Young Adults*

1678 This group includes all young adults aged 18–30 residing in the United States.

1679 *Rationale*

1680 In Phase 3, vaccine supply will become more widely available and allow for broader  
1681 immunization of the U.S. population, which is essential to stem transmission and restore full  
1682 social and economic activity. While both the case fatality rate and hospitalization rate for  
1683 COVID-19 are substantially lower in young adults aged 18–30, there is increasing evidence that  
1684 this group may be disproportionately fueling asymptomatic and/or pre-symptomatic transmission  
1685 (CIDRAP, 2020; Moghadas et al., 2020). Studies have shown that adults under the age of 30  
1686 report significantly higher levels of social contacts, and broader social networks, than adults in  
1687 any other age group (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2020), thus potentially putting them at heightened  
1688 risk of both COVID-19 exposure and transmission.

1689 In addition, this group includes college-aged individuals who are more likely to be living  
1690 in congregate settings—such as college dormitories, house shares and other communal living  
1691 facilities—and thus face increased risk of contracting SARS-CoV-2 infections. Numerous  
1692 outbreaks of COVID-19 are already occurring in such settings in the United States (NYT,  
1693 2020b). Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 infections in college-aged adults can threaten the health of  
1694 professors and other university staff, many of whom are older or have underlying illnesses that  
1695 put them at risk of severe COVID-19. Similarly, 2019 U.S. Census data show that approximately  
1696 one in two young adults currently live in parental homes, thus are at higher risk of transmitting  
1697 the infection to their family members, who may also be at increased risk of severe disease and  
1698 death due to age or other comorbidity (U.S. Census, 2019).

1699 Given the emerging evidence of the role of pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic  
1700 transmission in intrafamilial situations and/or congregate settings, the committee deemed it  
1701 critical to include this group in Phase 3.

1702 *Estimated Group Size*

1703           According the 2019 U.S. Census Bureau data, there are approximately 58 million young  
1704 adults between the ages of 18 and 30 (U.S. Census, 2019). Accounting for the potential overlap  
1705 with other groups across other phases, the committee estimates that approximately 46.5 million  
1706 young adults would be included in this phase.

1707 *Population: Children*

1708           This group includes all children—including schoolchildren who attend preschool,  
1709 elementary school, middle school, and high school.

1710 *Rationale*

1711           While the proportion of children who become infected with SARS-CoV-2 who become  
1712 severely ill is much smaller than that in adults, severe cases of COVID-19 do occur in children,  
1713 and the long-term effects of such illnesses are not yet understood. Children also can play a role in  
1714 COVID-19 disease transmission (Gaffney et al., 2020). Furthermore, when SARS-CoV-2  
1715 infections are documented in children, they can cause major disruptions of educational activities  
1716 (e.g., school closings, quarantine and isolation) for children, staff, and families. They can  
1717 threaten the health of teachers and staff, many of whom are older or have underlying illnesses  
1718 that put them at risk of severe COVID-19, as well as members of their extended families. These  
1719 disruptions can also reduce their parents' or guardians' ability to work. Vaccination, any needed  
1720 booster, and resultant transient or immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection among children will allow  
1721 schools of all types and sizes to safely re-open and remain open, which will, in turn, allow  
1722 parents and guardians to return to the workforce. At the same time, the other important benefits  
1723 to children being back in school (e.g., provision of nutritious meals, emotional well-being,  
1724 detection of and response to possible child abuse or neglect, etc.) can be realized. It will also be  
1725 critical to conduct additional trials to gain better understanding of safety and efficacy of COVID-  
1726 19 vaccine among children before they receive the vaccine.

1727 *Estimated Group Size*

1728           There are well over 80 million children (infant – 19 years of age) in the United States.

1729 *Population: Workers in Both Industries Essential to the Functioning of Society and at*  
1730 *Moderately High Risk of Exposure*

1731           Examples of such occupational groups include workers in restaurants, hotels, and the  
1732 entertainment industry; in banks and libraries; and in hair and nail salons, barber shops, and  
1733 exercise facilities, or in factories or other goods producing facilities. Many of these workers are  
1734 among the DHS designated categories of “Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers” and include  
1735 workers whose job is of economic importance, and who have continued to work from outside  
1736 their homes since the beginning of the pandemic. However, their risk of exposure or severe  
1737 illness is lower than that of members of Phase 2. The jobs of some of these workers are primarily  
1738 in settings where distancing and other protective measures can be implemented without great  
1739 difficulty, but who may still be at increased risk. There are others in this population group, like  
1740 those employed in entertainment, who cannot easily social distance or use PPE, but whose  
1741 industry was not considered as essential to societal functioning and was therefore suspended at  
1742 the beginning of the pandemic.

1743 *Rationale*

1744           These workers play important roles in society; are central to the return of commerce; and  
1745 are often exposed to large numbers of individuals in the performance of their jobs. Their safe  
1746 return to work is important as society re-opens and, comparing this cohort of workers to those  
1747 discussed in Phase 2, their inclusion in Phase 3 focuses more on prevention of transmission of  
1748 COVID-19. In comparison to workers called out in Phase 2, workers in Phase 3 are likely to  
1749 have lower exposure risk to COVID-19 through their occupation, hold a role that is considered  
1750 less central to economic and social recovery, or both. Nonetheless, including this group in Phase  
1751 3 will support social and economic recovery and restoration as access to the vaccine becomes  
1752 more widespread.

1753 *Estimated Group Size*

1754           The workers included here cover a wide variety of industries that are important to societal  
1755 function and reopening. Among those listed included restaurant wait staff (nearly 2.6 million),  
1756 hotel cleaning and management staff (nearly 1.2 million), bank tellers (442,000), librarians  
1757 (136,000), barbers, hair stylists and cosmetologists (406,000), and exercise instructors (326,000)

1758 (BLS, 2019a). Ideally, these workers included in this group would cover 80 percent of those  
 1759 from industries deemed to be essential.

#### 1760 **Phase 4**

1761 Phase 4 includes everyone residing in the United States. who did not receive the vaccine  
 1762 in previous phases (and for whom the vaccine is not medically contraindicated, though none are  
 1763 known at this time). In a pandemic caused by a new pathogen, most—if not all—individuals are  
 1764 at risk of being infected by the pathogen. Estimates in the percent of the population with  
 1765 immunity vary for COVID-19 and the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines is yet to be determined  
 1766 (Britton et al., 2020). Therefore, precise estimates of target vaccination coverage are not  
 1767 available. Nevertheless, resumption of social functions will require high vaccination coverage in  
 1768 the general population. Moreover, individuals have the right to protect themselves against SARS-  
 1769 CoV-2 and thus the right to have equitable access to vaccines against this virus in a timely  
 1770 manner. Therefore, the United States should ensure that all U.S.-based individuals who did not  
 1771 receive the vaccine in previous phases (and for whom the vaccine is not medically  
 1772 contraindicated) receive the vaccine within the first 12-18 months after the commencement of  
 1773 the vaccine roll out.

#### 1774 **Ensuring Equity**

1775 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the principles and allocation criteria underlying these  
 1776 phases explicitly avoid perpetuating health inequities, while implicitly valuing the essential  
 1777 social roles played by individuals in groups that have faced discrimination, as well as their  
 1778 greater risk due to health conditions reflecting inequities (Karaca-Mandic et al., 2020). In  
 1779 defining each priority group, the committee has considered their equity implications. For  
 1780 example, it has included all health care staff at the risk of infection exposure, and not those who  
 1781 are better paid (e.g., physicians, nurses). Each phase gives equal priority to all individuals in a  
 1782 group, facing similar exposure and with similar vulnerability. Nonetheless, when applying these  
 1783 criteria, vaccine distribution systems must actively ensure equity.

#### 1784 *Social Vulnerability Index*

1785 The data clearly demonstrate that people of color—specifically Black, Hispanic or  
 1786 Latinx, and American Indian and Alaska Native—have been disproportionately impacted by

1787 COVID-19 with higher rates of morbidity, mortality, and transmission. As previously mentioned,  
1788 there is currently no evidence that this is biologically mediated, but rather reflects the impact of  
1789 systemic racism leading to higher rates of comorbidities that increase the severity of COVID-19  
1790 infection and the socioeconomic factors that increase likelihood of acquiring the infection.

1791 The committee's allocation framework focuses on these underlying causes through the  
1792 application of CDC's Social Vulnerability Index within its framework instead of focusing on  
1793 discrete racial and ethnic categories. Vaccine should be allocated in adequate quantities to areas  
1794 of high social vulnerability and delivered, in a timely manner, at locations accessible to the  
1795 populations living in those areas. CDC's Social Vulnerability Index, developed for local  
1796 preparedness for public health emergencies such as natural disasters and disease outbreaks,  
1797 identifies geographic areas of vulnerability based on 15 census variables (ATSDR, 2018). These  
1798 variables capture many recognized social determinants of health (e.g., income or race/ethnicity),  
1799 indicators of access (e.g., transportation), infection transmission (e.g., crowding), increased risk  
1800 of adverse COVID-19 outcomes (e.g., proportion 65 or older). This index can be calculated at  
1801 the census tract level—enabling immunization programs to better identify areas of vulnerability.  
1802 Using CDC's Social Vulnerability Index in the committee's framework represents an attempt to  
1803 incorporate the variables that the committee believes are most linked to the disproportionate  
1804 impact of people of color. While other equity considerations such as disability status and age are  
1805 partially addressed in the criteria underlying the phases, there are additional concerns that need  
1806 to be addressed. For example, the ability of frail or disabled individuals to access vaccination  
1807 location must be taken into account while operationalizing vaccine access and delivery.

#### 1808 *Costs Associated with Vaccination*

1809 Several vaccines under development have received considerable taxpayer support.  
1810 Therefore, it is essential that COVID-19 vaccines are delivered through a central mechanism that  
1811 ensures vaccines to all individuals whatever their social and economic resources, employment,  
1812 immigration or insurance status. This is especially a concern when vaccine courses are  
1813 administered through private health providers, who may otherwise demand fees for the service.  
1814 In the national interest, Medicare and Medicaid should require free vaccine administration;  
1815 providers should not charge private plans or consumers; and private insurers and employers  
1816 should not charge co-pays or deductibles for vaccine administration.

1817           The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act requires health  
1818 insurance plans (group and individual) to offer vaccination without patient cost sharing (Section  
1819 3203) (KFF, 2020). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) required all private  
1820 insurance coverage to cover—without cost-sharing—immunizations that have a favorable ACIP  
1821 rating, but the CARES Act requires the coverage to begin within 15 days of the ACIP  
1822 recommendation, rather than the ordinarily much longer lag time.

1823           For those on Medicare, Part B will cover co-pay or administrative charges (Section  
1824 3713). Those on Medicare Advantage plans are similarly covered. The U.S. Department of  
1825 Veterans Affairs covers immunizations but service members and their families may have to pay  
1826 for the cost of an office visit.

1827           For Medicaid, coverage depends on the several factors. Most state Medicaid agencies  
1828 cover at least some adult immunizations but not all offer vaccines at the ACIP standards.  
1829 Generally, Medicaid covers ACIP-recommended vaccines for all beneficiaries up to age 21  
1830 under the program’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostics, and Treatment (EPSDT)  
1831 program. For children under 19, the Vaccines for Children Program guarantees free vaccination  
1832 to uninsured, underinsured, and American Indian and Native Alaskan children. Adults in a  
1833 Medicaid expansion plan or an Alternative Benefit Plan also receive ACIP-recommended  
1834 vaccines with no cost sharing. But for other adults, who are not in states with Medicaid  
1835 expansion and who are on traditional Medicaid coverage, it is up to each state to determine  
1836 whether to cover vaccines. There is an incentive to do so, as states that cover ACIP-  
1837 recommended vaccines and all the services recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task  
1838 Force may be eligible for increased federal payments. However, a survey of states prior to the  
1839 pandemic showed that only 22 were offering the full list of ACIP-recommended adult  
1840 vaccinations under their program (Granade et al., 2020; Shen and Orenstein, 2020).

1841           Additional resources are available to cover eventual COVID-19 vaccines for the  
1842 uninsured, including funds made available in the CARES Act through the Public Health and  
1843 Social Service Emergency Fund. The federal government has also used authorities under Section  
1844 317 of the Public Health Service Act to make vaccines available to uninsured adults. As of  
1845 October 1, 2012, Section 317-funded vaccines can be used to vaccinate uninsured or  
1846 underinsured adults, and for fully insured individuals seeking vaccines during public health

1847 response activities including outbreak response, mass vaccination campaigns or exercises for  
 1848 public health preparedness and individuals in correctional facilities and jails.

#### 1849 *Legal Status*

1850 All individuals in the United States and its territories should receive the vaccine in the  
 1851 appropriate phase irrespective of their legal status, and individuals whose legal status is uncertain  
 1852 should be reassured that their coming forward to receive the vaccine will not lead to deportation  
 1853 or be used against them in immigration proceedings. In addition to considerations of equity and  
 1854 fairness, including all individuals in the immunization program is appropriate from a disease  
 1855 control perspective. If there are pockets of susceptibility among those who do not receive the  
 1856 vaccine, the risk of outbreaks is likely to increase for everyone—including those who are legally  
 1857 present in the United States—as no vaccine is 100 percent effective.

#### 1858 *Considerations for Pregnant Women*

1859 While data on the risk of adverse outcomes associated with COVID-19 in pregnancy are  
 1860 uncertain, current evidence suggests that pregnant women are more likely to be hospitalized with  
 1861 COVID-19 than non-pregnant women (CDC, 2020h). Therefore, it is concerning that most, if not  
 1862 all, of the current Phase II/III trials exclude pregnant women; thus, putting them at a  
 1863 disadvantage for protecting themselves against SARS-CoV-2. OWS, NIH, and CDC should  
 1864 include assessment of vaccine efficacy, effectiveness, and safety among pregnant women in their  
 1865 clinical development and post-marketing surveillance plans. These data, and characteristics of  
 1866 the approved vaccine(s), will enable ACIP to develop recommendations for vaccinating pregnant  
 1867 women against SAS-CoV-2.

#### 1868 **Vaccine Allocation for the Military**

1869 The U.S. military, which is tasked with protecting the United States from foreign threats,  
 1870 currently comprises approximately 1.2 million active duty troops, 781,000 reservists, and  
 1871 728,000 civilian employees working for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD, 2020). The U.S.  
 1872 military has its own health care system, which serves active duty troops and their dependents;  
 1873 they live in diverse settings inside and outside the United States, ranging from onboard ships to  
 1874 military bases to civilian communities. Among active duty troops and their dependents are  
 1875 individuals at varying levels of risk of infection and life-threatening complications of COVID-



1876 19, including frontline health care providers; those living in congregate settings or in tightly  
1877 confined spaces (e.g., outbreaks have occurred on U.S. naval ships): and those with underlying  
1878 comorbid conditions associated with an increased risk of severe COVID-19, among others.  
1879 While the U.S. military has separate advisory groups (e.g. the Armed Forces Epidemiology  
1880 Board) and decision-making processes with regard to health care, disease prevention, and public  
1881 health, in the absence of a separate allotment of COVID-19 vaccine to the U.S. military, the  
1882 committee recommends that priority setting for the use of COVID-19 vaccine among active duty  
1883 troops and their dependents, as well as reservists, follow the principles and criteria set forth for  
1884 use in the civilian population. Civilian employees working for DoD should be considered for  
1885 COVID-19 vaccination, as appropriate, through programs established to provide vaccine to other  
1886 civilian populations.

### 1887 **Vaccine Allocation for Volunteer Participants in Vaccine Trials**

1888 There is a long tradition in biomedical research of offering research volunteers priority  
1889 access to interventions following trials (Cook, 2015; Emanuel et al., 2020; Resnik, 2018). .  
1890 Given this precedent, the committee assumes that volunteer participants in vaccine trials will be  
1891 vaccinated early *regardless* of the committee’s phased prioritization scheme because doing so is  
1892 a typical standard of vaccine trial protocol.

1893 The ethical principle underlying this allocation priority is the principle of fairness, which  
1894 includes what is often called reciprocity. This prioritization acknowledges the service that  
1895 volunteers have provided and the additional risk they have assumed in participating in the trial,  
1896 irrespective of any financial compensation for research subjects. A further justification for  
1897 including COVID-19 Phase III vaccine trial volunteers as an early priority group is the possible  
1898 effect on motivation to volunteer for trials, which may in turn increase the pace of recruitment  
1899 into trials and decrease the time needed to complete the target enrollment.

1900 The anticipated total in this group is approximately 150,000 individuals. OWS expects to  
1901 support up to seven Phase III trials of promising vaccine candidates, of which two are underway  
1902 in the United States as of mid-August 2020. Each Phase III trial plans to enroll approximately  
1903 30,000 participants. The total calculated here assumes that

1904

- 1905           • Four of the trials will fail, and *all* subjects in those trials are offered access to an  
 1906 approved vaccine ( $4 \times 30,000 = 120,000$ )
- 1907           • Three of the trials will succeed, and, under a 1:1 ratio between members of the  
 1908 treatment group compared to the placebo group, 15,000 participants from each of  
 1909 those trials who were assigned to the placebo condition are offered an approved  
 1910 vaccine ( $3 \times 15,000 = 45,000$ ) (HHS, 2020; NIH, 2020a,b).

### 1911           **Limitations and Additional Considerations on the Framework**

1912           The committee notes the following limitations and considerations as SLTT authorities  
 1913 adapt it to their local conditions. First, the phases identify population groups of similar priority.  
 1914 Within phases, authorities have the flexibility to adapt to their conditions. For example, some  
 1915 counties have no tertiary hospitals and are served by neighboring counties, and others may have  
 1916 chicken and pork production facilities. Some areas may have no evidence of virus spread and be  
 1917 given a lower geographic priority as compared to other areas of a state. SLTT authorities will  
 1918 have to make final decisions on refining and applying the suggested priorities listed here. In so  
 1919 doing they can refer to the principles and allocation criteria that guided the formulation of the  
 1920 phases.

1921           Second, the committee acknowledges the risk of potential unintended consequences of  
 1922 the allocation framework and the need to assess prioritization based on operational and supply  
 1923 realities. For example, immunizing older adults early on, and the resulting perception of their  
 1924 security, could “neutralize” one of the key reasons used to encourage younger people to follow  
 1925 guidance on preventive measures currently being encouraged to prevent the spread of COVID-  
 1926 19. This argument could apply to everyone who receives the vaccine and chooses not to be  
 1927 careful in regards to following key preventive measures. As such, the committee acknowledges  
 1928 that SLTT authorities and other decision makers need to remain vigilant of these realities and  
 1929 other public health interventions being implemented in tandem with the vaccine allocation and  
 1930 distribution.

1931           Third, the committee recognizes that properly classifying individuals in specific  
 1932 categories described above may be difficult to do in practice given the need to sort people based  
 1933 on individual level information, some of which may be difficult to collect or ascertain.  
 1934 Furthermore, as noted earlier, the dynamic nature of the COVID-19 pandemic means that



1962

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 2206



2207      **Applying the Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19  
Vaccine in Various Scenarios**

2208            At the time of writing, no COVID-19 vaccine has been approved for use in the U.S.  
2209 population, although a number of clinical trials are underway. There are many uncertainties  
2210 regarding if and when vaccines against COVID-19 will become available, under what regulatory  
2211 framework they will be approved for first use, what their ultimate product profiles will be (e.g.,  
2212 in terms of efficacy among different age groups, dosage schedule(s), and safety/adverse  
2213 reactions), as well as the schedule and timelines for expanding vaccine supply availability (e.g.,  
2214 when doses will become available and how quickly supply will expand). Chapter 2 of this report  
2215 outlined the foundational principles and allocation framework to be used in guiding the fair and  
2216 equitable use of scarce COVID-19 vaccine supply. This section envisions potential scenarios that  
2217 federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities may face in the use of new COVID-  
2218 19 vaccines. Consequently, this section starts with describing the best scenario. Subsequently,  
2219 the section identifies the possible and, in some cases, probable, deviations from this ideal  
2220 scenario.

2221

**AN ADAPTABLE AND DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK**

2222 It is important to emphasize that, whenever they become available, COVID-19 vaccines  
 2223 will be added to an already complex (and evolving) mix of public health strategies that include:  
 2224 nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) (such as mask usage, physical distancing, hand washing,  
 2225 etc.); expanded diagnostic testing linked to contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine (TTIQ)  
 2226 strategies aimed at containing transmission, suppressing outbreaks, and interrupting super-  
 2227 spreading events; and the deployment of therapeutic measures that mitigate morbidity and  
 2228 mortality and, ultimately, curtail transmission from those who do become infected (CDC, 2020;  
 2229 IOM, 2004; CDC, 2017). The principle that public policy should be evidence-based is essential  
 2230 to guiding the allocation of scarce countermeasures.

2231 Box 6 outlines some of the key uncertainties regarding COVID-19 vaccines. Given these  
 2232 uncertainties, SLTT authorities will need to be ready for varied and sometimes unexpected  
 2233 scenarios in determining how best to use their federal allocation.

2234

**BOX 6****Uncertain Factors Affecting Vaccine Allocation**

- Number and timing of available vaccine doses
- Number of available vaccine types
- Vaccine efficacy (overall and in different groups)
- Vaccine safety (overall and in different groups)
- Vaccine uptake (population acceptance, overall and in different groups)
- Epidemic conditions when vaccine becomes available
- Vaccine distribution and administration
- Political and regulatory environment

2235

2236 An ideal COVID-19 vaccine would be a one-dose vaccine that produces high levels of  
 2237 neutralizing antibodies in all age groups, prevents moderate-to-severe disease as well as  
 2238 infection, prevents transmission from infected individuals to other susceptible persons,<sup>27</sup> has very

<sup>27</sup> Current clinical trials are focused on clinical endpoints related to infection or mild-moderate symptomatic COVID syndrome and do not explicitly address the issue of transmission blocking.

2239 mild adverse reactions, has no severe adverse effects, and provides long-term protection. This is  
2240 the “best” scenario because such a product profile would be most compatible with widespread  
2241 use of the vaccine, both for personal protection and outbreak interruption. It would also be the  
2242 scenario that produces the greatest demand for the vaccine. Few vaccines will have such an ideal  
2243 product profile, with each shortcoming reducing demand (e.g., lack of efficacy in some age  
2244 groups, complex administration, adverse reactions), as will vaccine hesitancy.

2245 While major efforts are being made by the federal government through Operation Warp  
2246 Speed (OWS) to have a significant supply of vaccine as soon as possible, the committee has been  
2247 tasked with considering the tough choices that will need to be made with the tightly constrained  
2248 initial supplies (e.g., 10–15 million doses, enough to vaccinate 3–5 percent of the U.S.  
2249 population). In the initial period when demand exceeds supply, the committee, in Chapter 2,  
2250 recommended a phased approach, guided by evidence to maximize societal benefit by reducing  
2251 morbidity and mortality caused by the transmission of novel coronavirus. As highlighted above,  
2252 a range of uncertain factors related to the available vaccine(s) may affect the implementation of  
2253 the framework. Table 3 at the end of this chapter summarizes how the framework could be  
2254 affected in various scenarios.

### 2255 **Number and Timing of Available Vaccine Doses**

2256 OWS estimates that it will begin delivery of COVID-19 vaccines by January 2021.  
2257 However, given the uncertainty regarding how many doses will actually be available by January  
2258 2021, available vaccines should initially be allocated to individuals according to the phases  
2259 described in Chapter 2.

2260 It is possible that the vaccine will require two doses instead of one to ensure adequate  
2261 protection (IOM, 2013). In this case, two doses will be allocated to each person so that, in effect,  
2262 half as many people could be vaccinated. Vaccination would still follow the proposed allocation  
2263 framework, but some individuals would receive vaccination later. If the vaccine requires two  
2264 doses, strategies and systems (e.g., use of established providers or use of federally qualified  
2265 health centers) are necessary to help ensure continuity of care between the first and second dose.  
2266 This is important because if efficacy with only one dose is low, individuals who receive only one  
2267 dose are effectively unvaccinated and that vaccine dose was in essence wasted.

2268 A related issue is durability of protection. It may be that duration of protection is short  
 2269 enough that people vaccinated in an early phase must receive a booster dose before some  
 2270 individuals in later phases receive vaccination. Again, vaccination would still follow the  
 2271 proposed allocation framework, but some individuals in subsequent phases would receive  
 2272 vaccination later.

### 2273 **Vaccine Efficacy**

2274 Trials of a number of candidate vaccines are currently underway, but at this time the  
 2275 likely efficacy of each COVID-19 vaccine in preventing infection or in preventing severe disease  
 2276 is unknown. The level of efficacy in preventing infection will affect transmission of the infection  
 2277 in the population, and the level of efficacy in preventing severe disease will affect demand for  
 2278 acute and intensive hospital care—key factors relating to future management of COVID-19.  
 2279 Vaccine efficacy may also differ in different population groups (e.g., it might be less efficacious  
 2280 in older adults). Moderate to low efficacy may lead people to reject the vaccine, believing their  
 2281 risk of side effects or the “unknown” outweigh the benefit of vaccination (Smith, 2017).<sup>28</sup>  
 2282 Epidemic modeling—once a vaccine becomes available—could be useful to determine whether  
 2283 individuals in the priority groups identified in the committee’s framework should still be offered  
 2284 vaccination if the vaccine is determined to be less efficacious for their group. Once widespread  
 2285 vaccination commences, presumed efficacy may be influenced by how adherent people are to  
 2286 other basic protective measures such as masks and social distancing (CDC, 2020). Additional  
 2287 public messaging about maintaining such behaviors may be called for, particularly if people who  
 2288 are vaccinated erroneously believe they are no longer at risk of infection or transmission.

### 2289 **Vaccine Safety**

2290 Significant numbers of individuals must be vaccinated before vaccine safety is fully  
 2291 understood. When a vaccine becomes available, the knowledge concerning vaccine safety will be  
 2292 based on existing clinical trials which, of necessity, are limited. If it is found that certain  
 2293 population groups (e.g., children or older adults) experience significant side effects from the

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<sup>28</sup> To ensure that a widely deployed COVID-19 vaccine is effective, FDA stated the primary efficacy endpoint point estimate for a placebo-controlled efficacy trial should be at least 50 percent, and the statistical success criterion should be that the lower bound of the appropriately alpha-adjusted confidence interval around the primary efficacy endpoint point estimate is >30 percent. <https://www.fda.gov/media/139638/download> (accessed August 18, 2020).

2294 vaccine, it may be advisable to allocate the vaccine with caution to such population groups or to  
2295 reallocate it to a different group that is less vulnerable to those particular side effects. As the  
2296 vaccine starts to be allocated broadly in the U.S., monitoring of side effects and possible  
2297 adjustment of the allocation framework are essential to minimize possible side effects in the  
2298 population, while maximizing benefit by preventing deaths and severe disease. Effective  
2299 collection and communication of evidence regarding population effects, both efficacy and  
2300 adverse effects, are also essential to securing and maintaining public trust. Additionally,  
2301 vaccinated individuals should be assured of compensation (especially for health care costs) for  
2302 vaccine-related injuries. If the Department of Health and Human Services issues a Public  
2303 Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act declaration, preempting state tort remedies,  
2304 the government must then fully fund and make accessible PREP Act compensation. Failing to do  
2305 so will lead to distrust and anger if and when adverse events arise.

### 2306 **Vaccine Uptake**

2307 Vaccine hesitancy has been well documented among numerous population groups in the  
2308 United States. The COVID-19 vaccine is no exception: Many individuals will be hesitant to  
2309 receive a new COVID-19 vaccine, particularly if there are perceived safety concerns or if  
2310 vaccine efficacy is thought to be relatively low. Vaccine hesitancy will also be greater if there is  
2311 any suspicion that political or economic considerations have influenced the vaccine safety  
2312 assessments made by government regulatory or advisory bodies, such as the Food and Drug  
2313 Administration and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). It may be that  
2314 some people are “COVID-vaccine hesitant” and do not want to be vaccinated when it is offered  
2315 to them—despite their individual risk—but would be willing to be vaccinated later when more  
2316 evidence about vaccine safety has accrued. Thus, although an individual may be prioritized in  
2317 our allocation framework, that person may refuse to be vaccinated when vaccination is offered to  
2318 them, in which case the vaccine should be offered to another individual within that priority  
2319 group. Of course, if enough individuals refuse to accept the vaccine, the resulting population  
2320 protection (reduction in deaths and COVID-19 transmission) due to the vaccine may not be high.

2321 Messages about vaccine safety and efficacy are essential for all people and at all phases.  
2322 Direct-to-consumer advertising may influence public perceptions and preferences. It is critical  
2323 that the communication campaign accompanying the vaccine outline the risks and benefits of the

2324 vaccine in a way that members of the population can understand (Malik et al., 2020). Health care  
2325 providers can also play an important role in communicating vaccine risks and benefits to their  
2326 patients. Additionally, if vaccine uptake is low, the idea of adhering to an allocation framework  
2327 could lead some providers to shift to lower priority groups or be left with excess vaccine stock.  
2328 Programs should do everything possible to reach all individuals in one priority group, before  
2329 proceeding to the next one. That will include making special efforts to address issues related to  
2330 health inequities that may reduce trust in some groups or make health care less accessible to  
2331 them.

### 2332 **Number and Timing of Available Vaccine Types**

2333 It is possible that multiple vaccine types, and not just a single vaccine, will be made  
2334 available in early 2021. If this happens, the available vaccines might be rated on a spectrum by  
2335 ACIP with recommendations about which groups should receive which vaccines. The available  
2336 vaccines may have major differences in important features (e.g., safety and efficacy, overall and  
2337 in different populations; duration of protection; robustness of immune response; etc.) and it is  
2338 important to determine which vaccine is best for different groups, based on all the information  
2339 available when a vaccine is released. Vaccines would still be allocated to the different phases,  
2340 with the rate of allocation to different groups determined by availability of the vaccine(s) for that  
2341 group. For example, if Vaccine A is determined to be best for individuals in Phases 1 and 4, and  
2342 Vaccine B is determined to be best for individuals in Phases 2 and 3, then vaccination with  
2343 Vaccine A would proceed for individuals in Phase 1 followed by Phase 4, while vaccination with  
2344 Vaccine B would proceed for individuals in Phase 2 followed by Phase 3. It is also possible that,  
2345 after an initial vaccine is made available, a safer or more effective vaccine may be released. In  
2346 this case, vaccine allocation must take into account the benefits and harms of the vaccine for  
2347 each particular population group. To the extent possible, vaccines would continue to be made  
2348 available in the same phases as outlined in the framework. However, if a particular vaccine is  
2349 inappropriate for use by a particular group, that group would need to wait for a new form of a  
2350 vaccine, and the existing vaccine might be provided to those who otherwise are slated for a later  
2351 phase. With multiple available vaccines, it is particularly important to monitor safety and  
2352 efficacy as immunization efforts progress so as to ensure that different population groups receive  
2353 an appropriate vaccine.

2354 **Epidemic Conditions and Immune Status**

2355 At the time of writing, COVID-19 is spreading widely in the U.S., across many states and  
2356 jurisdictions, with 50,000–70,000 newly identified cases each day and 1,000–2,000 deaths daily.  
2357 Increasing numbers of cases are occurring among younger people, who are also thought to be  
2358 key agents in transmitting the disease. It is currently not known how long immunity from  
2359 COVID-19 infection lasts, nor the extent to which transmission may be reduced in different  
2360 populations due to more people acquiring immunity from having been infected. If sufficient  
2361 numbers of individuals in a population group are immune due to previous infection, then it may  
2362 be that scarce vaccine doses should be allocated to individuals in other prioritized population  
2363 groups. Conversely, if the infection is found to be spreading particularly rapidly in a particular  
2364 geographic region or population group, it may be reasonable to prioritize allocating vaccines to  
2365 that region or group. This could be done by holding back a certain fraction of vaccine doses (e.g.,  
2366 10 percent) for use in vaccinating individuals in COVID-19 “hot spots” who are at high risk of  
2367 infection and who cannot protect themselves.

2368 Personal protective behavior—such as sheltering in place, social distancing, and wearing  
2369 face masks—also affects the spread of COVID-19 (CDC, 2020). It is essential that vaccinated  
2370 individuals be encouraged to engage in personal protective behavior to the extent that they are  
2371 able to.

2372 **Vaccine Distribution and Administration**

2373 Specific details of how the COVID-19 vaccine will be distributed and administered have  
2374 not been fully determined at this time. The vaccine is being developed through the federal OWS  
2375 initiative, and presumably the federal government will issue guidelines for allocation,  
2376 distribution, and administration of the vaccine. The extent to which states will be obligated to  
2377 follow such guidelines is not known. Such state-level decisions will affect the implementation of  
2378 the vaccine allocation framework. As an example, a state may make a commitment to set aside a  
2379 certain fraction of vaccine doses for tribal governments in that state (this would be a supplement  
2380 to what would be allocated by the federal government through the Indian Health Service).

2381 **Social, Economic, and Legal Contexts**

2382 The social, economic, and legal contexts will affect vaccine distribution and uptake. For  
2383 example, if some health insurers, care providers, or employers fail to cover the full vaccine  
2384 administration cost, the allocation framework is unchanged, but the federal government or states  
2385 should make efforts to provide funds to cover the cost of vaccine administration (and other  
2386 vaccination costs) for low-income individuals.

2387 Once vaccine availability has increased sufficiently and vaccine safety in younger groups  
2388 has been assessed, children will be offered a COVID-19 vaccine (Mello et al., 2020).  
2389 Historically, the most effective way to ensure broad uptake of vaccine in children is through  
2390 mandates that condition school attendance on evidence of vaccination or an accepted reason for  
2391 exemption, such as a medical contraindication. There will certainly be wide variation among  
2392 states and even within states regarding such mandates, particularly with respect to whether non-  
2393 medical exemptions will be allowed. To ensure an orderly return to schools, states may benefit  
2394 from having their mandates clarified by attorneys general issuing interpretations of existing  
2395 authorities and their departments and agencies issue interpretative guidance, or by considering  
2396 ways to tighten existing law regarding exemptions. Despite the allocation framework, it is  
2397 possible that some school districts may be tempted to mandate vaccination of schoolchildren  
2398 immediately, as a means of moving more quickly toward re-opening schools. At a state level,  
2399 this would allocate the vaccine in a manner different from the committee’s proposed allocation  
2400 framework (i.e., by prioritizing schoolchildren).

2401 Another possibility is that some employers would require employees to be vaccinated or  
2402 to have some evidence of prior infection (on the employer’s assumption that this confers  
2403 immunity) (Phelan, 2020). If a state is not allocating vaccine supplies in accordance with the  
2404 recommended phases, this would divert vaccine supplies toward many who are not in the higher  
2405 risk categories described in Phases 1 and 2. If large employers acquire doses of the vaccine, as  
2406 has happened in the past with 2009 H1N1 vaccines, this could limit supplies available to state  
2407 and local health departments. Although there is precedent for employers requiring vaccination,  
2408 subject to some limitations based on union agreements or religious exemptions, (e.g., many  
2409 hospitals and nursing homes require employees to be vaccinated against the flu) a number of  
2410 concerns arise when vaccine supply is limited, as it will be with COVID-19 vaccine(s). If  
2411 employers require vaccination, the allocation framework would be unchanged, but pressure



2412 would certainly be brought to bear on health care providers by people needing to maintain their  
2413 employment, regardless of whether they are at high risk of infection. Such a requirement could  
2414 change rates of vaccine uptake, and would pose a dilemma for those individuals for whom the  
2415 vaccine is medically contraindicated—either take the vaccine or lose employment—and would  
2416 be a possible violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Yang et al., 2020). Mandated  
2417 vaccination could also violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if there is a religious  
2418 exemption or could violate collective bargaining rights (in unionized workplaces). Additionally,  
2419 it is important to note that the equitable allocation scheme will fail if a separate private vaccine  
2420 market emerges for those who can pay the most. SLTT authorities should not waiver from their  
2421 adherence to the proposed equitable allocation scheme to satisfy the demands of private  
2422 employers or institutions that are seeking or requiring vaccination of all workers.

2423         As a final example, if states do not provide free vaccine access to people without  
2424 documentation of legal status, then the allocation framework is unchanged, but other sources of  
2425 financial support (e.g., philanthropy, health systems, pharmaceutical companies) will be needed  
2426 to assure access to vaccination for those individuals.

2427

2428 **DRAFT TABLE 3** Summary Table of the Application of the Committee’s Framework in Various Scenarios

<b>Scenario</b>	<b>Change in Allocation Framework</b>
<b>Number and Timing of Vaccine Doses</b>	
Fewer vaccine courses available than expected by Operation Warp Speed	Allocation framework is unchanged. Some individuals receive vaccination later than they would otherwise.
Vaccine requires two doses, rather than one	Allocation framework is unchanged, but some individuals receive vaccination later. Vaccination should use strategies and systems (e.g., use of established providers or use of federally qualified health centers) to ensure continuity of care between the first and second dose.
<b>Number of Vaccine Types</b>	
More than one vaccine type available	Allocation framework is unchanged, but which vaccines are allocated to which population groups must take into account the benefits and harms of the vaccine for each population group.
<b>Vaccine Efficacy</b>	
Low vaccine efficacy among older adults or other population subgroup	Only allocate to this population subgroup if vaccine benefits outweigh the risks.
<b>Vaccine Safety</b>	
Unanticipated vaccine side effects	Continuously monitor vaccine safety as the vaccine is rolled out. Only allocate to individuals for whom vaccine benefits outweigh the risks
Significant vaccine side effects among older adults or other population subgroup	Continuously monitor vaccine safety as the vaccine is rolled out. Only allocate to this population subgroup if vaccine benefits outweigh the risks.
<b>Vaccine Uptake</b>	
Vaccine uptake is lower than expected	Allocation framework is unchanged. The communication campaign accompanying the vaccine must outline the risks and benefits of the vaccine in a factual way that members of the population can understand.
<b>Epidemic Conditions and Immune Status</b>	
Epidemic spread is continuing across much of the U.S. when the vaccine becomes available	Allocation framework is unchanged. Public health messages must continue to stress the need for personal protective measures (e.g., masks, social distancing).
Epidemic is spreading most rapidly in particular hot spots when the vaccine becomes available	A certain fraction of vaccine courses (e.g., ten percent) is reserved for vaccinating individuals in hot spots. Public health messages must continue to stress the need for personal protective measures (e.g., masks, social distancing).
<b>Vaccine Distribution and Administration</b>	

States are required to follow federal guidelines for vaccine allocation	Allocation framework is unchanged.
States have some leeway in the extent to which they follow federal guidelines for vaccine allocation	States adapt the allocation framework to their needs (e.g., they may set aside a certain number of doses for particularly vulnerable populations in their state).
<b>Social, Economic, and Legal Contexts</b>	
Some health insurers do not cover full vaccine administration cost	Allocation framework is unchanged, but the federal government or states should make efforts to provide funds to cover the cost of vaccine administration (and other vaccination costs) for low-income individuals.
Some employers require proof of vaccination	Allocation framework is unchanged, but such requirements could change rates of vaccine uptake, and would pose hazards for those individuals for whom the vaccine is medically contraindicated and could raise issues around discrimination against those unable to obtain the vaccine and therefore unable to work
Some states mandate vaccination of schoolchildren	Allocation framework is unchanged, but states mandating vaccination of schoolchildren might allocate the vaccine in a manner different from the Committee's proposed allocation framework (i.e., prioritize schoolchildren)
Some states do not provide free vaccine access to people without documentation of legal status	Allocation framework is unchanged. Other sources of financial support (e.g., philanthropy, health systems, pharmaceutical companies) should be sought to provide vaccination for those individuals.

2429

2430

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This discussion draft was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.

We thank the following individuals for their review of this discussion draft:

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Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this discussion draft nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this discussion draft was overseen by **Bruce N. Calonge**, The Colorado Trust, **Ellen W. Clayton**, Vanderbilt University, and **Susan J. Curry**, University of Iowa. They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this discussion draft was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.

## Appendix A

### Committee Biosketches

**William H. Foege, M.D., M.P.H. (Co-Chair)**, is Emeritus Presidential Distinguished Professor of International Health, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, and a Gates Fellow. Dr. Foege, an epidemiologist, worked in the successful campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s. Dr. Foege became Chief of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Smallpox Eradication Program, and was appointed director of the CDC in 1977. In 1984, Dr. Foege co-founded the Task Force for Child Survival, a working group for the World Health Organization, UNICEF, The World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Foege served The Carter Center between 1986–1992 as its Executive Director, Fellow for Health Policy and Executive Director of Global 2000. Between 1992–1999, he contributed to the Center’s work as a Fellow and as Executive Director of the Task Force for Child Survival and Development. Between 1999–2001, Dr. Foege served as Senior Medical Advisor for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

**Helene D. Gayle, M.D., M.P.H. (Co-Chair)**, has been president and chief executive officer (CEO) of The Chicago Community Trust, one of the nation’s oldest and largest community foundations, since October 2017. Under her leadership, the Trust has adopted a new strategic focus on closing the racial and ethnic wealth gap in the Chicago region. For almost a decade, she was president and CEO of CARE, a leading international humanitarian organization. An expert on global development, humanitarian and health issues, Dr. Gayle spent 20 years with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, working primarily on HIV/AIDS. She worked at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, directing programs on HIV/AIDS and other global health issues. She also launched the McKinsey Social Initiative (now McKinsey.org), a nonprofit that builds partnerships for social impact. Dr. Gayle serves on public company and nonprofit boards, including The Coca-Cola Company, Colgate-Palmolive Company, Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, New America, the ONE Campaign, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Economic Club of Chicago. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Public Health Association, the National Academy of Medicine, the National Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Named one of Forbes’ “100 Most Powerful Women” and one of NonProfit Times’ “Power and Influence Top 50,” she has authored numerous articles on global and domestic public health issues, poverty alleviation, gender equality and social justice. Dr. Gayle was born and raised in Buffalo, NY. She earned a B.A. in psychology at Barnard College, an M.D. at the University of Pennsylvania and an M.P.H. at Johns Hopkins University. She has received 18 honorary degrees and holds faculty appointments at the University of Washington and Emory University.



**Margaret L. Brandeau, Ph.D., M.S.**, is the Coleman F. Fung Professor of Engineering and Professor of Medicine (by Courtesy) at Stanford University. Her research focuses on the development of applied mathematical and economic models to support health policy decisions. Her recent work has examined HIV and drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, programs to control the opioid epidemic, and preparedness plans for public health emergencies. She is a Fellow of The Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS) and a member of the Omega Rho Honor Society for Operations Research and Management Science. From INFORMS, she has received the Philip McCord Morse Lectureship Award, the President’s Award (for contributions to the welfare of society), the Pierskalla Prize (for research excellence in healthcare management science), and the Award for the Advancement of Women in Operations Research and the Management Sciences. She has also received the Award for Excellence in Application of Pharmacoeconomics and Health Outcomes Research from the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research and a Presidential Young Investigator Award from the National Science Foundation, among other awards. She is a member of the National Institutes of Health Office of AIDS Research Advisory Council and a member of the Stanford-Lancet Commission on the North American Opioid Crisis. She previously served as a member of the Board of Scientific Counselors, a Federal Advisory Committee to the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and served on several Institute of Medicine committees. Professor Brandeau earned a BS in Mathematics and an MS in Operations Research from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a Ph.D. in Engineering-Economic Systems from Stanford University.

**Alison M. Buttenheim, Ph.D., M.B.A.**, is an Associate Professor of Nursing and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Buttenheim is a leading expert in the application of behavioral economics to infectious disease prevention. Her research agenda has focused on vaccine acceptance and vaccine exemption policy in the United States, zoonotic disease prevention in Peru, and HIV prevention in South Africa. She is Associate Director of Penn’s Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics, as well as Associate Director of Penn’s National Clinician Scholar Program, and Director of Engagement at the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. She was recently appointed Commissioner to the Lancet Commission on Vaccine Refusal, Acceptance, and Demand in the United States. Dr. Buttenheim holds a Ph.D. in Public Health from the University of California, Los Angeles, and an M.B.A. from the Stanford University Graduate School of Business.

**R. Alta Charo, J.D.**, is the Warren P. Knowles Professor of Law and Bioethics at the University of Wisconsin, where she teaches public health law, biotechnology policy, and bioethics. In government, she has worked at the former congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. From 1996–2001, she served on President Clinton’s National Bioethics Advisory Commission. A member of the National Academy of Medicine, Ms. Charo co-chaired the National Academies’ committees that wrote guidelines for embryonic stem cell research and recommendations for U.S. policy and global principles regarding human genome editing. She was a member of the Institute of Medicine’s committee on the safety of the pediatric vaccine schedule and the committee to review of the smallpox vaccine program. At present she is a member of the World Health Organization’s committee on global governance of genome editing, and serves on several

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine activities, including committees on emerging infectious diseases and on emerging science and technology issues. She received her B.A. in biology from Harvard University in 1979 and her J.D. from Columbia Law School in 1982.

**James F. Childress, Ph.D., M.A.**, is emeritus professor, previously University Professor, the John Allen Hollingsworth Professor of Ethics, Professor of Religious Studies, and Professor of Research in Medical Education at the University of Virginia. Dr. Childress also served as the Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., Professor of Christian Ethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University and a Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago Divinity School and Princeton University. In 1990, he was named Professor of the Year in the Commonwealth of Virginia by the Council for the Advancement and Support of Education, and in 2002 he received the University of Virginia's highest honor—the Thomas Jefferson Award. In spring 2010 he held the Maguire Chair in American History and Ethics at the Library of Congress. Dr. Childress is the author of numerous articles and several books in various areas of ethics, including (with Tom Beauchamp) *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, now in its 8th edition and translated into several languages. Dr. Childress was vice chair of the national Task Force on Organ Transplantation, and he also served on the Board of Directors of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the UNOS Ethics Committee, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee, the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee, and several Data and Safety Monitoring Boards for National Institutes of Health clinical trials. He was a member of the presidentially appointed National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1996–2001). Dr. Childress is a member of the National Academy of Medicine and he has participated in and chaired several studies at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. His current research focuses on public bioethics, public health ethics, and just-war theory and practice. Dr. Childress received his B.A. from Guilford College, his B.D. from Yale Divinity School, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale University.

**Ana V. Diez Roux, M.D., Ph.D., M.P.H.**, is Dean and Distinguished University Professor of Epidemiology in the Dornsife School of Public Health at Drexel University. Dr. Diez Roux is internationally known for her research on the social determinants of population health, the study of how neighborhoods affect health, and urban health. Her work on neighborhood health effects has been highly influential in the policy debate on population health and its determinants. She has led large National Institutes of Health and foundation funded research and training programs in the United States and in collaboration with various institutions in Latin America and is currently Principal Investigator of the Wellcome Trust funded SALURBAL (Salud Urbana en América Latina) study. Dr. Diez Roux has served on numerous editorial boards, review panels and advisory committees including the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee of the Environmental Protection Agency (as Chair), the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Center for Health Statistics, the Committee on Health and Wellbeing in the Changing Urban Environment of the International Council for Science, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's Community Preventive Services Taskforce. She has received the Wade Hampton Frost Award for her contributions to public health from the American Public Health Association and the Award for Outstanding Contributions to Epidemiology from the American College of Epidemiology. She is an elected member of the American Epidemiological Society and the

Academy of Behavioral Medicine Research. She was elected to the National Academy of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in 2009.

**Abigail Echo-Hawk, M.A.**, is an enrolled citizen of the Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma. She is currently the Chief Research Office at Seattle Indian Health Board and the Director of Urban Indian Health Institute, a national tribal epidemiology center serving urban-dwelling American Indians and Alaska Natives. Currently, Abigail is part of multiple committees, boards, and workgroups that are focused on ending health disparities through health equity approaches including the Best Starts for Kids Board, the March of Dimes Health Equity Workgroup, the Tribal Collaboration Working Group with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) All of Us Research Program, the Advisory Committee for Health Equity Research at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the National Institute on Drug Abuse American Indian and Alaska Native Collaborative Research Engagement Workgroup, and Data for Indigenous Justice Board. In the past, Ms. Echo-Hawk spent eight years as the Tribal Liaison with Partnerships for Native Health at the School of Public Health at The University of Washington. In 2016, she became the Co-director of Partnerships of Native Health at the Washington State University Institute for Research and Education to Advance Community Health. Ms. Echo-Hawk was also the Tribal Relationship Facilitator at the Institute of Translational Health Sciences at the University of Washington from 2010 to 2015. In 2015, she became a Board Member for the Center for Indigenous Law and Justice. She has a B.A. in Interdisciplinary Studies and an M.A. in Policy Studies, both from the University of Washington who honored her with the Distinguished Alumna of the Year Award in 2011. She is an expert in American Indian and Alaska Native health, including strengths and resiliencies as well as disparities and was recently awarded the Washington State Public Health Association Secretary of Health Award and 2020 Indian Woman of the Year by a national organization of Indigenous women. Ms. Echo-Hawk began working in health equity in 2000 as a community advocate to address the high rates of infant mortality among American Indians and Alaska Natives (AI/AN). After recognizing the lack of evidence-based practices that were informed and shaped by AI/AN communities, she began working in research on health disparities and achieving health equity in 2010. Since then, she has been the tribal liaison for 26 multi-year, NIH-funded studies of Native health. Her role in each study was to ensure that relationships between academia and Native communities are bi-directional and grounded in health equity principles. In her current role as the Director of Urban Indian Health Institute (UIHI), she directs the only national tribal epidemiology center, and they are conducting COVID-19 epidemiologic surveillance with urban Indian health programs. In addition, UIHI is focused on health equity approaches ensuring AI/AN access to prevention and treatment of COVID-19 through Indigenous public health and epidemiology practices. An essential component of Ms. Echo-Hawk's work in facilitating protocols and ground rules for research partnerships has included negotiating equity through tribal data-sharing, control, and ownership. Many communities have experienced untrustworthy practices where agencies and individuals have exploited and used data with little to no meaningful impact, while people of color continue to bear the burden of health disparities. Data is increasingly valued as a resource that represents opportunities for improving community well-being and health outcomes if it is used in an equitable manner. Ms. Echo-Hawk works nationally with collaborative partnerships to ensure equitable health outcomes for people of color and other marginalized communities. Much of her work involves community-based participatory research, with a strong emphasis on cultural humility, respect for tribal sovereignty, and achieving health equity to undo health disparities. In

addition to many health equity-focused publications, she is a co-author of several manuscripts in development.

**Christopher Elias, M.D., M.P.H.**, is the president of the Global Development Division at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, where he leads the foundation's efforts in a diverse range of program areas aimed at finding creative new ways to ensure solutions and products get into the hands of people in poor countries who need them most. Focusing on areas with the potential for high-impact, sustainable solutions that can reach hundreds of millions of people, Dr. Elias oversees Global Development's portfolio in Emergency Response; Family Planning; Maternal, Newborn & Child Health; Nutrition; Polio Eradication; and Vaccine Delivery. A common theme of these programs is innovative and integrated delivery, including an emphasis on strengthening of primary health care systems. Dr. Elias' professional background is in public health and medicine. Prior to joining the Gates Foundation in February 2012, he worked in various positions and countries for international nonprofit organizations, most recently serving as the president and chief executive officer of PATH, an international, nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the health of people around the world by advancing technologies, strengthening systems, and encouraging healthy behaviors. Chris holds an M.D. from Creighton University, having completed postgraduate training in internal medicine at the University of California San Francisco, and an M.P.H. from the University of Washington, where he was a fellow in the Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholars Program. He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine.

**Baruch Fischhoff, Ph.D.**, is Howard Heinz University Professor, Department of Engineering and Public Policy and Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). A graduate of the Detroit Public Schools, he holds a B.S. (mathematics, psychology) from Wayne State University and a Ph.D. (psychology) from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and of the National Academy of Medicine. He is past President of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making and of the Society for Risk Analysis. He has chaired the Food and Drug Administration Risk Communication Advisory Committee and been a member of the Eugene (Oregon) Commission on the Rights of Women, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee and the Environmental Protection Agency Scientific Advisory Board, where he chaired the Homeland Security Advisory Committee. He has received the American Psychological Association (APA) Award for Distinguished Contribution to Psychology, CMU's Ryan Award for Teaching, an honorary Doctorate of Humanities from Lund University, and an Andrew Carnegie Fellowship. He is a Fellow of APA, the Association for Psychological Science, Society of Experimental Psychologists, and Society for Risk Analysis. His books include *Acceptable Risk*, *Risk: A Very Short Introduction*, *Judgment and Decision Making*, *A Two-State Solution in the Middle East*, *Counting Civilian Casualties*, and *Communicating Risks and Benefits*. He has co-chaired three National Academy Colloquia on the Science of Science Communication, as well as its committees on applying decision science to intelligence analysis and its committee on foundational science for cybersecurity.

**David Michaels, Ph.D., M.P.H.**, is an epidemiologist and Professor of Environmental and Occupational Health at the Milken Institute School of Public Health of George Washington University. He served as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration from 2009 to 2017, the longest serving in the agency’s history. From 1998 to 2001, Dr. Michaels was Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety and Health, charged with protecting the workers, community residents, and environment in and around the nation’s nuclear weapons facilities. In that position, he was the chief architect of the historic initiative to compensate nuclear weapons workers who were sickened by radiation, beryllium, and other toxic exposures. Much of Dr. Michaels' work has focused on protecting the integrity of the science underpinning public health, safety, and environmental protections. On this topic, he is the author of *Doubt is Their Product: How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your Health* (Oxford University Press, 2008) and *The Triumph of Doubt: Dark Money and the Science of Deception* (Oxford University Press, 2020). He is a recipient of the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Award, and the American Public Health Association’s David P. Rall Award for Advocacy in Public Health. Dr. Michaels is a member of the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Toxicology Program, the Administrative Conference of the United States, and the Lucian Leape Institute of the Institute for HealthCare Improvement. He currently provides consulting advice on protecting workers from COVID-19 exposure to the Actors’ Equity Association and the National Football League Players Association.

**Jewel Mullen, M.D., M.P.H., M.P.A., FACP**, is Associate Dean for Health Equity and Associate Professor of Population Health and Internal Medicine at the University of Texas at Austin Dell Medical School, as well as Director of Health Equity at Ascension Seton. An internist and psychosocial epidemiologist, Dr. Mullen is the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services where she also served as the acting Assistant Secretary for Health and acting Director of the National Vaccine Program Office. Formerly the commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health, she led the agency’s successful implementation of an expanded childhood vaccine program. She also completed bioethics training and served on the Ethics Consultation Service at the University Of Virginia School Of Medicine. A former President of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Dr. Mullen is a current member of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Editorial Board. She also serves on the COVID-19 Expert Advisory Panel for the City of Austin, Texas.

**Saad B. Omer, Ph.D., M.P.H., M.B.B.S., FIDSA**, is the Director of the Yale Institute for Global Health, a Professor of Medicine and Epidemiology at Yale University, Schools of Medicine and Public Health and an Adjunct Professor at Yale School of Nursing. He has conducted studies in the United States, Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Australia and South Africa. Dr Omer’s research portfolio includes epidemiology of respiratory viruses such as influenza, RSV, and—more recently—SARS-Cov-2 (COVID-19); clinical trials to estimate efficacy of maternal and/or infant influenza, pertussis, polio, measles and pneumococcal vaccines; and trials to evaluate drug regimens to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Moreover, he has conducted several studies on interventions to increase immunization coverage and acceptance. His work has also included public health preparedness strategies to effectively respond to large emerging and re-emerging infectious disease outbreaks. Dr Omer’s work has been cited in global and country-specific policy recommendations and has informed clinical practice and health legislation in several countries. Dr. Omer is the Co-Chair of the Lancet Commission on Vaccine Hesitancy in the US, serves on the National Vaccine Advisory Committee Working Group for

Vaccine Hesitancy and is on the Board of Trustees for the Sabin Vaccine Institute. He is also a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety, the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) Working Group on COVID-19 Vaccines, and the WHO SAGE Working Group on Measles and Rubella Vaccines. Dr. Omer is also currently an academic affiliate for the U.S. Government Accountability Office's Office of Evaluation Sciences. He has previously served on several advisory panels including the U.S. National Vaccine Advisory Committee, Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria - Vaccine Innovation Working Group, WHO Expert Advisory Group for Healthcare Worker Vaccination, and the Public Health Committee of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. Dr. Mullen serves as a public health advisor to the Carnival Corporation and advises the Director of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's Foundation on development of internal organizational equity goals.

**Daniel Polsky, Ph.D., M.P.P.**, is the 40th Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Health Economics at Johns Hopkins University. He holds primary appointments in both the Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Carey Business School. From 1996–2016 he was on the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was the Robert D. Eilers Professor at the Wharton School and the Perelman School of Medicine. From 2012–2019 he served as executive director of the Leonard Davis Institute for Health Economics. Dr. Polsky a national leader in the field of health policy and economics, has dedicated his career to exploring how health care is organized, managed, financed, and delivered, especially for low-income populations. His own research has advanced our understanding of the cost and quality tradeoff of interventions whether they are changes to large federal programs or local programs. He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine. He serves on the Health and Medicine Division Committee for the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. He serves on the Congressional Budget Office's Panel of Health Advisers and was the senior economist on health issues at the President's Council of Economic Advisers. He received a M.P.P. degree from the University of Michigan in 1989 and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 1996.

**Sonja Rasmussen, M.D., M.S.**, is Professor in the Departments of Pediatrics, Epidemiology, and Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Florida (UF) College of Medicine and College of Public Health and Health Professions where she serves as director of UF's Precision Health Program, which focuses on integration of genomics into clinical care. Dr. Rasmussen joined UF in 2018 after 20 years at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, where she held several scientific leadership roles. In her recent roles as a public health leader, she served as Deputy Director of the Influenza Coordination Unit, responsible for CDC's pandemic influenza preparedness and response activities, and led CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, an office with a \$1.3 billion annual budget and >900 staff members, as Acting Director during the 2014 Ebola response. She served as Editor-in-Chief of CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series, the #1 journal in the field of epidemiology according to number of citations, and as the Director of the Division of Public Health Information Dissemination. Dr. Rasmussen was lead author of the paper confirming Zika virus as a cause of birth defects, published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2016. She served in leadership roles during several CDC responses to public health emergencies, including 2009 H1N1 influenza, H7N9 influenza, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and Zika virus. Dr. Rasmussen received

her B.S. in Biology and Mathematics with magna cum laude honors from the University of Minnesota-Duluth, her M.S. degree in Medical Genetics from the University of Wisconsin, and her M.D. degree with honors from University of Florida. She completed her pediatrics residency at Massachusetts General Hospital and her fellowship in clinical genetics at Johns Hopkins and University of Florida. Dr. Rasmussen is currently serving in a leadership role at the University of Florida in its response to COVID-19, including consulting with university leadership about containment and mitigation measures. She has published seven papers focused on what is known about this new virus in children and pregnant women. She is an author on >240 peer-reviewed publications and is the lead editor of The CDC Field Epidemiology Manual, released by Oxford University Press in 2019.

**Arthur L. Reingold, M.D.**, is Professor and Head of the Division of Epidemiology at the School of Public Health at the University of California, Berkeley, having joined the faculty there in 1987. His research interests encompass the prevention and control of infectious diseases in the United States and internationally, particularly infections spread via the respiratory route and vaccine preventable diseases. He has previously served on the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and on the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunizations of the World Health Organization. He was elected to membership in the National Academy of Medicine in 2003 and has previously served on multiple committees of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

**Reed V. Tuckson, M.D., FACP**, is Managing Director of Tuckson Health Connections, LLC, a health and medical care consulting business that brings people and ideas together to promote optimal health outcomes and value through innovation and integration across the fields of prevention; public health; consumer activation; quality care delivery; the translation of science and technology into value producing interventions; and optimization of big data and analytics. Previously, he enjoyed a long tenure as Executive Vice President and Chief of Medical Affairs for UnitedHealth Group; Senior Vice President for Professional Standards of the American Medical Association; Senior Vice President of the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation; President of the Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science; and Commissioner of Public Health for the District of Columbia. Currently, Dr. Tuckson is President of the American Telemedicine Association and he serves on the Board of Directors of LifePoint Health, a leading hospital company dedicated to providing high-value care and services to growing regions, rural communities and vibrant small towns across the nation; Cell Therapeutics, Inc., a public corporation concerned with the development of cancer pharmaceuticals; and he is a special advisor to the CEO of ViTel Net, LLC, a leading innovator in telehealth solutions. Additionally, he serves on the National Advisory Council for Complementary and Integrative Health of the National Institutes of Health; he is an elected member of the National Academy of Medicine, serving in a leadership position on the use of data and analytics in healthcare; he is a board member of The Arnold P. Gold Foundation, which is concerned with advancing humanism in medical care; an advisory board member of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics; and a trustee of the Board of Howard University. Previously, Dr. Tuckson was a member of the Advisory Committee to the Director of the National Institutes of Health; served as Chairman of the Secretary of Health's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society; and he has served on several U.S. Government cabinet level health advisory committees concerned with health reform, infant mortality, children's health, violence, and radiation testing. He is a graduate of

Howard University, Georgetown University School of Medicine, and the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania’s General Internal Medicine Residency and Fellowship Programs, where he was also a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Clinical Scholar studying at the Wharton School of Business.

**Michael R. Wasserman, M.D., C.M.D.**, is a geriatrician and President of the California Association of Long Term Care Medicine. He has been an advocate for vulnerable older adults during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the lead author of “Diagnostic Testing for SARS-Coronavirus-2 in the Nursing Facility: Recommendations of a Delphi Panel of Long-Term Care Clinicians,” and “An Aspirational Approach to Nursing Home Operations During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” He is Editor-in-Chief of Springer’s upcoming textbook, *Geriatric Medicine: A Person Centered Evidence Based Approach*. He previously served as chief executive officer for Rockport Healthcare Services, overseeing the largest nursing home chain in California. Prior to that, he was the Executive Director, Care Continuum, for Health Services Advisory Group, the Quality Innovation Network–Quality Improvement Organization for California. In 2001 he co-founded Senior Care of Colorado, which became the largest privately-owned primary care geriatrics practice in the country, before selling it in 2010. In the 1990’s he was President and chief medical officer for GeriMed of America, where he helped to develop GeriMed’s Clinical Glidepaths. In 1989, in the *Journal of the American Geriatrics Society*, Doctor Wasserman published “Fever, White Blood Cells and Differential Count in Diagnosing Bacterial Infection in the Elderly,” the findings of which are now part of the McGeer Criteria, used widely in nursing homes to evaluate residents for infections. Dr. Wasserman is a graduate of the University of Texas, Medical Branch. He completed an Internal Medicine residency at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and a Geriatric Medicine Fellowship at University of California at Los Angeles. He was formerly a Public Commissioner for the Continuing Care Accreditation Commission. He was the lead delegate from the State of Colorado to the 2005 White House Conference on Aging, and co-chaired the Colorado Alzheimer’s Coordinating Council. Dr. Wasserman serves on the Boards’ of the Wish of a Lifetime Foundation and the American Geriatrics Society’s Foundation for Health in Aging.



## Appendix B

### Staff Biosketches

**Lisa Brown, M.P.H.**, serves as the study director for the Committee on Equitable Allocation of Vaccine for the Novel Coronavirus and is a senior program officer on the Board on Health Sciences Policy at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Her primary interests are in health security, and she currently directs several activities on emerging infectious diseases and 21st century health threats, evidence-based practices for public health emergency preparedness and response, and resiliency of the medical supply chain. Previously, she directed consensus studies on data needs to monitor the evolution of SARS-CoV-2 and the resiliency of the academic biomedical research community. Prior to joining the National Academies, Ms. Brown served as Senior Program Analyst for Public Health Preparedness and Environment Health at the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). In this capacity, she served as project lead for medical countermeasures and the Strategic National Stockpile, researched radiation preparedness issues, and was involved in high-level CDC initiatives for the development of clinical guidance for anthrax and botulism countermeasures in a mass casualty event. In 2015, Ms. Brown was selected as a fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative at the Center for Health Security, a highly competitive program to prepare the next generation of leaders in the field of biosecurity. Prior to her work at NACCHO, Ms. Brown worked as an Environmental Public Health Scientist at Public Health England (PHE) in London, England. While at PHE, she focused on climate change, the recovery process following disasters, as well as the impact of droughts and floods on emerging infectious diseases. She received her M.P.H. from King's College London in 2012 and her B.S. in biology from The University of Findlay in 2010.

**Aurelia Attal-Juncqua, M.Sc.**, is an associate program officer at the Board on Health Science and policy, with the Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies. Prior to joining the National Academies, Aurelia worked for three years as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Global Health Science and Security at Georgetown University. Previously, Ms. Attal-Juncqua also briefly worked as a business analyst in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry in London, as well as a researcher for the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. In addition to her role at the National Academies, Ms. Attal-Juncqua is a part-time doctoral student in Health Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. She previously received a B.Sc. (Hons) in Biology and Microbiology from Imperial College in London, and an M.Sc. in Control of Infectious Diseases from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Her main professional interests include

biosecurity, capacity building for prevention and control of infectious diseases, as well as public health emergency preparedness and response.

**Rebecca F. Chevat** is a senior program assistant in the Health and Medicine Division of the National Academies. She was a recipient of a Health and Medicine Division Spot Award in 2019. Ms. Chevat graduated from American University in 2018. She received her B.A. in public health with concentrations in psychology and political science. During her undergraduate career, she worked in the Office of the Secretary and in the Office of Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security where she examined public–private partnerships and their role on points of dispensing models during emergencies. Ms. Chevat also has experience working on Capitol Hill and on political campaigns. Additionally, she is a National Registered Emergency Medical Technician. She plans to pursue her M.P.H. in global health.

**Emma Fine** is an associate program officer on the Board on Health Sciences Policy and has worked at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for four years. Previously, she staffed a project on the Board on Global Health assessing morbidity and mortality from HIV/AIDS in Rwanda. She also worked on the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences where she helped bridge the gap between academic experts and intelligence analysts for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to joining the National Academies, Ms. Fine interned for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response where she contributed research to the National Health Security Strategy Implementation Plan as well as the intersection between terrorism and public health preparedness. In 2016, Ms. Fine graduated from the University of California, Berkeley where she earned her Bachelor of Arts in public health and public policy. She is particularly interested in the nexus between public health, intelligence, and national security and plans to pursue a degree in national security or enter the Foreign Service.

**Elizabeth Finkelman, M.P.P.**, is a senior program officer in the Office of the President at the National Academy of Medicine (NAM). In her role, she directs NAM special projects and initiatives, including the Action Collaborative on Countering the U.S. Opioid Epidemic, the Healthy Longevity Global Competition, and previously, the Vital Directions for Health and Health Care initiative. Prior to joining the NAM in 2015, Ms. Finkelman spent several years working in program administration and research within the Division on Earth and Life Studies at the National Academies. She completed her undergraduate degree at McGill University, double majoring in cell and molecular biology and political science. She has a M.P.P. from the George Washington University with a concentration in health policy.

**Ben Kahn, M.P.H.**, is an associate program officer on the Board on Health Sciences Policy (HSP), and he currently staffs the Standing Committee on Emerging Infectious Diseases and 21st Century Health Threats and the Committee on Equitable Allocation of Vaccine for the Novel Coronavirus. Ben completed his M.P.H. in May 2020 at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, where he also earned a certificate in Vaccine Science and Policy. His M.P.H. capstone project, conducted in collaboration with Bloomberg’s International Vaccine Access Center, focused on characterizing and understanding vaccine hesitancy in South Asia. While completing his M.P.H., Ben also interned at the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, supporting the organization’s work around vaccine development for COVID-19. Prior to his time

at Johns Hopkins, Ben spent four years working at the National Academies in research and project management, supporting a range of activities including several in HSP's health security and public health preparedness portfolios. Ben received his B.A. in history and anthropology from the University of Michigan.

**Rose Marie Martinez, Sc.D.**, is Senior Board Director of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Board on Population Health and Public Health Practice (1999 – Present). The board has a vibrant portfolio of studies that address high profile and pressing issues that affect population health. The board addresses the science base for population health and public health interventions and examines the capacity of the health system, particularly the public health infrastructure, to support disease prevention and health promotion activities, including the education and supply of health professionals necessary for carrying them out. The board has examined such topics as the safety of childhood vaccines and other drugs; systems for evaluating and ensuring drug safety post-marketing; pandemic influenza planning; the health effects of cannabis and cannabinoids; the health effect of environmental exposures; the integration of medical care and public health; women's health services; health disparities; health literacy; tobacco control strategies; chronic disease prevention; and other topics. Prior to joining the National Academies, Dr. Martinez was a Senior Health Researcher at Mathematica Policy Research (1995–1999) where she conducted research on the impact of health system change on the public health infrastructure, access to care for low-income populations, managed care, and the healthcare workforce. Dr. Martinez is a former Assistant Director for Health Financing and Policy with the U.S. General Accounting Office where she directed evaluations and policy analysis in the area of national and public health issues (1988–1995). Her experience also includes six years directing research studies for the Regional Health Ministry of Madrid, Spain (1982–1988). Dr. Martinez is a member of the Council on Education for Public Health, the accreditation body for schools of public health and public health programs. Dr. Martinez received the degree of Doctor of Science from the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health.

**Andrew Pope, Ph.D.**, is Director of the Board on Health Sciences Policy of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. He has a Ph.D. in physiology and biochemistry from the University of Maryland and has been a member of the National Academies staff since 1982 and of the Health and Medicine Division staff since 1989. His primary interests are science policy, biomedical ethics, and environmental and occupational influences on human health. During his tenure at the National Academies, Dr. Pope has directed numerous studies on topics that range from injury control, disability prevention, and biologic markers to the protection of human subjects of research, National Institutes of Health priority-setting processes, organ procurement and transplantation policy, and the role of science and technology in countering terrorism. Since 1998, Dr. Pope has served as Director of the Board on Health Sciences Policy which oversees and guides a program of activities that is intended to encourage and sustain the continuous vigor of the basic biomedical and clinical research enterprises needed to ensure and improve the health and resilience of the public. Ongoing activities include Forums on Neuroscience, Genomics, Drug Discovery and Development, and Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies. Dr. Pope is the recipient of the Health and Medicine Division's Cecil Award and the National Academy of Sciences President's Special Achievement Award.